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system of general commercial law in the United States, announced
in W'atson v. Torpley, and recognised in general phrase by some
other decisions of the Federal courts, as existing independent of
the laws of the respective states, is utterly illusive: that the
courts of the United States know and administer that system of
commercial law which they find to obtain under the laws of the
state, and these conclusions flow naturally from the just, long-
established and adequate rule of the lex loci, in which, as a general
principle, there seems to be a universal consent of all common-law
courts and jurists; to it indeed may well be applied the maxim of
Cicero, " -Non erit alia lex Romce, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia
posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore una eademque
lex obtinebit." ROBERT G. STREET.
Galveston, Texas.
RECENT ^MERICAN DEOISIONS.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
ALLEN ET AL. V. INHABITANTS OF JAY.
The legislature of the state has no power to pass a law authorizing a town to
raise money either by taxat:on or issuing its bonds, and loan the same to private
parties, to enable them to erect mills and manufactories in such town, thereby to
increase its wealth and business, as well as the accommodation of its inhabitants.
Such an object is entirely a private one, and in no sense entitled to be called a
public use of such a character as to justify the imposition of taxes upon the in-
habitants and property of a town by the vote of the majority of such town.
The minority of the inhabitants in such case may lawfully demand for their
protection, the interposition of this court by way of injunction.
A T WN-MEETING of the inhabitants of Jay was duly called to
see if the town would loan its credit to Hutchins & Lane, on cer-
tain terms, provided ic said Hutchins & Lane shall move their new
saw-mill and box factory from Livermore Falls to Jay Bridge, and
also put in operation one run of stones for grinding meal, and
establish their manufacturing business as soon as the month of
September A. D. 1870, at or near Jay Bridge."
At a legal meeting held upon this call on April 19th and by
adjournment on April 21st 1870, the town "voted to loan their
credit to the amount of ten thousand dollars, at six per cent.
annually to H. W. Hutchins and B. R. Lane, provided said iHutch-
ins & Lane will invest the amount of from twelve to thirteen
thousand dollars in building a steam saw-mill, box factory ma-
chinery and land, also to put in one run of stones for grinding meal,
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to be located at or near Jay Bridge, and to keep the above-named
property in good repair, and also keep it amply insured, and to
cause said manufacturiig business to be carried on for a term not
less than ten years, said IHutchins & Lane to'pay all the interest,
and ten per cent. of the principal anmally after three years," the
town to be secured by a mort.m-e of thelnill, machinely aw~d land
"at the rate of one dollar for every seventy-five ce:its thus loaned
by said town,, and the selectmen are heroby authorized to i-sue
town bonds for the above ainouzt, payable in yearly instalments
after three years at six per cent. interest annually, viz. : one thou-
sand dollars the first year, and nine hundred dollars each year for
the ten succeeding years, providing tle whole amount shall be
necessary to establish said niamifixeturig busines .. "
The legislatur,, pased an act. chapter 716, approved February
25th 1S71, in the f)llowing terms:
"Whereas npo due i-uvesti!,ration and consideration we deem it
for the benefit of the town of .lay. and of the people of this state,
said town is hercxv authorized to loan the sum of ten thousand
dollars to Ilutchii & Lane, in accordauce with a vote taken by
said town on the 21st day of April, eiglteen hundred and seventy,
for the encouragement of manufeturing in said town."
The complainants, ten taxable inhabitants of Jay. under R. S.
C. 77, § 5, by which this court has equity jurisdiction, " when
counties, cities, towns or school districts,: for a purpose not author-
ized by law, vote to pledge their credit or to raise money by taxa-
tion, or to pay money from their treasury," have filed a bill in
equity, praying that the defendants and all thiAr officers may be
el.joined from issuing certain bom(li, duly described in the bill, the
issue thereof being for a purpose not authorized by law.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
APPLETON. C. J.-The purp,,se of the Act is obvious, and the
iiquirr is whether the purlpose is one authorized by law?
Whether the loan be of town bond- or of money, as. if the loan
be of bonds. the town must ultimately be liable fbr their payment,
and as the paymeujit is to be raised by taxation, matters lnot. The
ouestion 1roposed is whether the legislature can authorize towns to
raimoe mey by taxation for the purpose of loaning the money so
raised to -uch borrowers as may promise to engage in manufactur-
ing or any other buinness the town may prefir, for their private
gain and emolument. Is the raising of money to loan to such
tersons as the town may determine, as borrowers, a legal exercise
of the power of taxation? Ultimately it will be PIumld that the
question resolves itself into ain inquiry, ihether the ;,4 2d-lature
can ostitmt.oma,!ll - authHrize ie ma.i0rity of a mown t hi, tlI-ir
'wu aM the 1m1oney of a miimo'ity r'sde!l by taxatiol il ; i"
.he will of such minority, a, such majority mnamv det,.riie.
A tax is a sum of money assessed under the authojit of ti
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state, on the personal property of an individual for the use of the
state. Taxation, by the vwry meaning of the term, implies the
raising of money for public uses and excludes the raising if for pri-
vate objects and purposes. "1 I concede" says BLACK, C. J., in
Sharpless v. Mayor, &c., 21 Penn. 167, "that a law authorizing tax-
ation for any other than public purposes is void." "A tax," re-
marks GREEN, C. J., in Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch. 839, "is an
impost levied by authority of government, upon its citizens or
subjects for the support of the state."
"No authority or even dictum can be found," observes DILLON,
C. J., in Ramson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, "which asserts that there
can be any legitimate taxation when the m6ney to be raised does
not go into the public treasury or is not destined for the use of the
government or some of the governmental divisions of the state."
If there is any proposition about which there is an entire and
uniform weight of judicial authority, it is that taxes are to be im-
posed for the use of the people of the state in the varied and
manifold purposes of government and not for private objects or
the special benefit of individuals. Taxation originates from and
is imposed by and for the state.
In this case the vote of the town of Jay and the act of the
legislature passed to enable the town to carry that vote into effect,
are both before us. Taking the vote of the town in connection
with the article in the warrant calling the meeting, it seems that
Hutchins & Lane had a "new saw-mill and box factory at Liver-
more Falls," which they were then carrying on at that place, and
the town of Jay proposed to loan their credit for ten thousand
dollars and issue bonds of the town for that amount, if they would
remove their saw-mill and box manufactory and put in one run of
stones for grinding meal to be located at or near Jay Bridge. The.
vote contemplates a mere matter of private business, the removing
of certain business from one town to another, whereby the town
to which the removal is made is expected to be a gainer by en-
couraging manufactures therein, and the town from which the
removal is made is to be a loser to precisely the same extent by
their removal therefrom.
Capital naturally seeks the best investment, or its owners do.
Those who by industry and economy have become capitalists are
more likely to invest it well than those who, having gained none,
have none to lose. The sagacity shown in the acquisition of capital,
is best fitted to control its use and disposition.
It is obvious that if the removal from Livermore Falls would be
made without special inducement, in other words, if the prospect
of profit at Jay Bridge were sufficient to induce Messrs. Hutchins
& Lane to move their saw mill, &c., without any special offer of
the defendant town, there would be no necessity for making such
offer. It is not readily perceived that raising money under such
:.ircumstances would be of public benefit. If they should not sc
ALLEN v. INHABITANTS OF JAY.
deem it and it is not advantageous on the whole for them to make
the removal, then it is a premium offered for them to make a
removal injurious to their interest, and which they would not
otherwise make, and of sufficient magnitude to induce them to
meet the probable loss. Still less can it be conceived to be of
"benefit" in such case to raise money to pnomote losing enterprises.
It is said that it induces enterprises which would not otherwise
be undertaken. But why not undertaken ? Every man is the
best judge of his interest. There may be exceptions, but such is
the general rule. Now why is not capital invested at Jay Bridge?
The answer is obvious. No one having capital to invest or loan
is willing, for any existing prospect of gain, to invest or to loan
money to be thus invested. The want of existent capital or suffi-
cient probability of profit, are reasons why the proposed under-
taking has not been carried into operation.
The idea seems to be that thereby capital would be created.
But such is not the case. Capital is the saving of past earnings
ready for productive employment. Tl'e bonds of a town may
enable the holder to obtain money by their transfer as he might
do by that of any good note. But no capital is thereby created.
It is only a transfer of capital from one kind of business to another.
Nor is capital created by the raising of money by taxation. If
the wealth of the country were increased by taxation, the result
would be the higher the taxes the more rapid the increase of its
wealth. But the reverse is the case. The wealth of the country
is lessened by the time spent in assessing and collecting taxes, and
by the taxes collected, if unproductively expended.
Is the removal of the new saw-mill, &c., by Messrs. Hutchins
& Lane, a public or private enterprise? Hutchins & Lane are
now at Livermore. They propose to remove to Jay Bridge. It is
their interest alone which they will consider. But why remove ?
It is no more a public purpose than any other removal of manufac-
ture from one town to another. The town of Jay is to have no
share in the anticipated profits of Messrs. Hutchins & Lane. The
state is not to be a partaker of their gains. The new mill, &c.,
being removed, the town of Jay stands in precisely the same rela-
tion to it as other towns to new or old mills within their limits, so
far as regards any public benefit to be derived therefrom. The
timber of the inhabitants is sawed at the usual compensation.
Their grists are ground for the same customary toll as those of
others.
The industry of each man and woman engaged in productive
employment is of "benefit" to the town in which such industry is
employed. This can be predicated of all useful labor-of all pro.
ductive industry. But because all useful labor, all productive
iii.lustry conduces to the public benefit, does it follow that the
people are to be taxed for the benefit of one man or of one special
kind of manuf'acturing ? If so, then there is no kind of labor, no
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manufacturing for which the minority of a town may not be
assessed for the benefit of an individual. There is nothing of a
public nature in the new saw-mill of Hutchins & Lane, any more
entitling them to special aid than the owners of any other saw
mill. The sailor, the farmer, the mechanic, the lumberman ar(
equally entitled to the aid of coerced loans to enable them to carr%
on their business with Messrs. Hutchins & Lane. Our governmen
is based on equality of right. The state cannot discriminate amoni.,
occupations, for a discrimination in favor of one is a discriminatio
adverse to all others. While the state is bound to protect all, i
ceases to give that just protection when it affords undue advar -
tages, or gives special and exclusive preferences to particular ind'-
viduals and particular and special industries at the cost and charg-
of the rest of the community.
Unless there is something peculiar and transcendental in th
new saw-mill to be removed and in the grist-mill to be erected and
in the labor of Messrs. Hutchins & Lane, it must stand in the
same category with other saw-mills and grist-mills, which are and
have been and will be built, and other laborious industries which
are pursued for private gain and emolument.
The alleged justification for raising money to be loaned to
private individuals for their own profit arises from the supposed
public benefit to be made of the money so loaned. But the moment
the loan is effected the bonds and money raised from their sale
become the bonds and money of the person borrowing, and subject
to his control. The town have lost all power over the use and
disposition of their loan. True, they may sue for any violation of
the contract, if any is made, in reference to the manner of its
employment. The loan, when once made, becomes like all other
loans. The borrower has it-it is his. The loan effected there is
the end of the matter.
The question recurs, can the town raise money by taxation
merely to loan again to individuals for their own purposes ? for it
has been seen that the loan effected, the town loaning cannot con-
trol the use of the loan, and the loan is merely for the benefit of
the individual borrowing. The bonds to be loaned or the money
to be loaned are in the hands of the loaning committee. It is to
be loaned for a longer or shorter time, upon security good, bad,
"ndifferent; fortunate, if only the latter. Is the loaning of bonds
or money by the town in any respect different from the loaning
of money by individuals? Does the mere fact that the town makes
the loan irrespective of any other consideration make the loan a
public "benefit" more than, or different from any other loan by
an individual or banking corporation having funds to loan?
That a town cannot raise money to divide again among its
inhabitants was conclusively settled long ago in this state in
Ilooper v. .Emery, 14 Me. 379, "to contend," observes SHEPLEY,
J., "that towns have the power to assess and collect money for
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the purpose of distributing it again according to numbers, is to ask
for a construction not only entirely unauthorized by the languagr
of any statute, but in direct opposition to the language of limita-
tion employed in giving powers to towns to grant money. It not
only does this, but it asks the court to give a construction t,,
statutes, which would authorize towns, if so disposed, to violat.
the principles of moral justice. For if the right to assess and
collect money is without limit, it would not be difficult to continue
the process of collection and division until the whole property held
by the citizens of the town had passed into and out of the trea-
sury; and until an equalization of property had been effected, a';
nearly as it could be expected to be by" placing it all in one con-
mon fund and then dividing it by numbers, per capita, without
distinction of sex or age. Such a construction would be destruc-
tive of the security and safety of individual industry and exertion.
It would authorize a violation of what is asserted in our declara-
tion of rights, to be one of the natural rights of men, that of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property. Such a construction
would authorize a violation also of that clause in the constitution
of this state, which provides that private property shall not be
taken for public uses without just compensation, nor unless the
public exigencies require it. No public exigency can require that
one citizen should place his estates in the public treasury for no pur-
pose but to be distributed again to those who have not contributed
to accumulate them, and who are not dependent on public charity."
But whether the money raised is to be distributed per capita or
loaned, can make no diffcrence in principle. If towns can assess
and collect money to be again loaned to such persons as the major-
ity may select for such purposes as it may favor, with such securitv
or without security as it may elect, property ceases to be protected
in its acquisition or enjoyment. Whether the estates of citizens are
to be placed in the public treasury for the purpose of dividing them,
or of loaning them to those who have not accumulated them, mat-
ters not. In either case, the owner is despoiled of his estate and
his savings are confiscated.
If the loan be made to one or more for a particular object, it is
favoritism. It is a discrimination in favor of the particular indi-
vidual, and a particular industry thereby aided, and is one adverse
to and against all individuals, all industries not thus aided.
If it is to be loaned to all, then it is practically a division of
property under the name of a loan. It is communism incipient,
if not perfected.
If it were proposed to pass an act enabling the inhabitants of the
several towns by vote to loan the horses or oxen or to lease the
iouses to some individual for his private gain, whom the majority
may select, the monstrous absurdity of such legislation would be
transparent. But the mode by which property would be takerl
from one or more and loaned to others can make no difference. rt
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is the taking to loan, or otherwise dispose of for private purposes,
against the consent of the owner, that constitutes the wrong, no
matter how taken. Whether the horse be taken from the reluctant
owner to be loaned to some favored livery-stable keeper, or the
loan be of money raised by the collector on its sale, or by the pay-
ment of the tax to avoid such sale, does not change the result. In
either case the horse or the value thereof :s loaned by others, with-
out the owner's consent. If a part of one's estate may be taken
from him and loaned to others, another and another portion may
be taken and loaned until all is gone.
By the constitution of this state "1 certain natural inherent and
unalienable rights" are guaranteed to the citizens of this state,
"1 among which are those of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
What motive is there for the acquisition of property, if the tenure
of the acquisition is the will of others ? How can our property be
protected, if the legislature can enable a majority to transfer by
gift or loan, to certain favored and selected individuals, through
the medium of direct taxation, such portions of one's estate as they
may deem expedient. Alen only earn when they are protected in
the acquisition, possession and enjoyment of their property. The
barbarous nations of Asia have neither industry nor capital, the result
of saving, for the reason that property is without protection. Where
is the protection of property if one's money or his goods can be
wrested from him and loaned to others? Where is the difference
between the coerced contribution of the tax gatherer to be loaned
to individuals for their benefit, and those of the conqueror from the
inhabitants of the conquered territory ? If one's money may be
taken from him without and against his consent, to be loaned to
an individual whom he would not trust, for a time which might be
inconvenient, for a purpose which he might deem injudicious, what
protection is afforded him? What would be thought of a statute
requiring individuals to give their notes to others to be discounted
for their special benefit, or to raise money to be thus loaned. What
differs it whether individuals are compulsorily required to loan their
notes on time to others, to be discounted for such others, or the
bonds of the town to be loaned, which the citizens may ulti-
mately be compelled to pay. All security of private rights, all
protection of private property is at an end, when one is compelled
to raise money to loan at the will of others, or to pay his contribu-
tory share of loans of money or bonds made to others for their cwn
use and benefit, when the power is given to a majority to lend or
give away the property of an unwilling minority.
Further, by the constitution, "private property shall not be
taken for public uses without just compensation, and unless public
exqencies require it.
The right of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty. It
is the right to seize and appropriate specific articles of property
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for public use when some public exigency requires it, and not
otherwise.
But this is not the case of taking private property under tho
right of eminent domain, but of taking it under the power of tax-
ation. But the power of taxation as well as the right of eminent
domain has its limits, which cannot be constitutionally transcended.
In his answer to certain inquiries proposed by the legislature
of this state, 58 Maine 616, Mr. Justice TAPLEY uses the following
clear and expressive language: "Without entering at this time
into a discussion or recapitulation of the reasons for the rule and
the necessities which require it, I hold that the taking of private
property, against the will of the owner, must find a justification in
some public use and under some public exigency, and accompanied
by a just compensation, and this is true whether the property be a
direct seizure of it in specie and irrevocably committing it to a use,
or taken by the indirect method of a loan, accompanied by some
fancied or real security for a subsequent reimbursement."
"Some distinction has been sought to be made between the right
to seize specific articles of property for public use, and obtaining
money through the ordinary forms of taxation, and we sometimes
have a justification under the taxing power of the government. I
am not able to perceive the soundness of the distinction. I under-
stand that the right and power of taxation rests upon the right as
described by Judge SToRY of the sovereign power to appropriate
not only the public property, but the private property of all citi-
zens within the territorial sovereignty to public purposes. The
difference is in the mode of taking only."
Three elements are required to bring a case within the provision
of the constitution under consideration-a public use-a public
exigency and a just compensation.
Is the removal of a new saw-mill by the owners from one town to
another adjacent, to be there carried on by themselves for their
own profit, for the public use? Is the building of a new grist-mill,
the toll to be taken by the builders, for the public use ?
Is it any more for the public use than any other industry, the
benefit of which incidentally results to the public, but which is car-
ried on for private gain. If MAessrs. Rutehins & Lane were to
saw for the public without compensation or grind all grists brought
to their mill without toll, the saw-mill and the grist-mill might be
deemed public, precisely as a court-house or state-house or highway
is public; but it is not pretended that such is their intention.
They remove because more sawing is to be done and more tolls are
to be taken. The charges are not to be lessened. The saw-mill
and the grist-mill are private property, as are all other mills and
farms owned by individuals, carried on for their own use and profit,
and enacting that they are for a public use, without changing the
rights of the public in the least degree, as to their rights to use
them cannot alter the question. It is beyond the legislative
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rower, by force of an enactment, to make that public which iv
essentially private.
But a public use is not all. Is there any public exigency
existing requiring the removal of the new saw-mill of Hutchins &
Lane from Livermore Falls to Jay Bridge to be there carried on
for their benefit? Does the public exigency require the building
of a new saw-mill there? If there is such public use and pub-
lic exigency, then anybody's land or mill site and land may be
taken from him by vote of the town and leased to a lessee to be
selected and voted for by the majority, and his money may be
wrested from him by the tax gatherer, to pay for the mill to be
erected thereon.
The remarks of Mr. Justice WOODBURY in the West River
Bridge Co. v. Dix et al., 6 How. 545, are very pertinent and appli-
cable to the question under consideration. "Nor do I agree that,
in all cases of public use, property which is suitable or appropriate
can be condemned. * * * But the doctrine that this right of
eminent doman exists for every kind of public use, or for such use
when merely convenient, though not necessary, does not seem to
me by any means clearly maintainable. It is too broad, too open
to abuse. When the public use is one, general and pressing, like
that often in war, for sites of batteries or for provisions, little doubt
would exist as to the right.
"But when we go to other public uses not so urgent, not con-
nected with precise localities, not difficult to be provided for with-
out this right of eminent domain, and in places where it will be
only convenient, but not necessary, I entertain strong doubts of
its applicability. Who ever heard of laws to condemn private pro-
perty for a public use, for a marine hospital or state prison ?
"1 So a custom-house is a public use for the general government,
and a court-house or jail for the state. But it would be difficult
to find precedent or argument to justify taking private property,
without consent, to erect them on, though appropriate for the pur-
pose. No necessity seems to exist which is sufficient to justify so
strong a measure."
But if there is no such exigency in the cases mentioned, even
where the use is public, for taking private property without con.
sent, still less can there be such exigency where the use is private.
If there is no such exigency as will justify the taking of a ,xan's
land for a jail or court-house, still less is there for taking his mill
site which he may wish to occupy, or his money which he may wish
to use, to lease the one and loan the other, or any part thereof: to
enable Messrs. Hutchins & Lane to place their new saw-mill oi to
erect a new grist-mill thereon, or to furnish them with funds to
carry on their own business.
Neither is there found the just compensation which the con-
stitution requires. The possible contingent and indirect benefit
resulting from a manufacturing- business, the prospects of which
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tire such that the manufacturer will not invest his own-the pros.
pects of which are such that he either will not or cannot borrow
funds for the purpose-and the only mode of obtaining them is tie
enforced contribution from those whio have no funds to loan, or hav-
ing them, have no faith in the object for which the contributory
assessment and collections is made nor in the individual for whose
use and profit they are collected, assuredly is not the.just compen-
sation contemplated. If the result proves fortunate, which can
hardly be anticipated, the indirect benefit is no just compensation
to those who have no participation in the profits. If unfortunate,
it is still more difficult to perceive the "public benefit" likely to
result from an unsuccessful and disastrous speculation.
That the money may possibly be repaid is not the just compen-
sation justifying a compulsory loan. It may never be repaid, and
then where is the compensation? Besides, the true question is
whether a man is to lend his own money or others are to loan it
for him, and if he is unwilling to advance to a tax gatherer, for
others to loan, the legislature can constitutionally authorize the
sale of his property, or commit him to jail for non-payment ?
The constitution further provides that no person shall "be
deprived of his life, liberty, property or privileges but by the judg-
ment of his peers or the law of the land." Property taken by
taxation is not taken by the judgment of one's peers. A statute
in direct violation of the essential principles of justice is not "the
law of the land" within the meaning of the constitution. Every
citizen holds life, liberty and property by the law and under its
protection. Every enactment is not of itself and necessarily the
law of the land. To declare it to be so would render this portion
of the constitution nugatory and ineffectual. The phrase is
adopted from MNagna Charta: "As to the words from Magna
Charta," observes JoHNSON, J., in Bank v. Oakley, 4 Wheat. 28.3,
* * * "after volumes -spoken and written, with a view to their ex-
position, the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to
this that they were intended to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private right and distributive justice."
But can any one conceive a more arbitrary exercise of the powers
of government than the arbitrary collection of money from one
man to loan the same to another.
The constitutional provision that ", private property shall not be
taken for PUBLIC USES without just compensation ; nor unless the
public exigencies require it," by necessary implication prohibits
the taking of private property for private purposes by legislative
action.
If the use or the exigency for which property is taken is public.
the determination of the legislature that the recesZity of so taking
it exists, is conclusive. Spring v. Russell, 7 Greenl. 273.
As private property can only be taken without the consent of
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the owner for public uses and upon the payment of just compen-
sation and the existance of a public exigency requiring it to be
so taken, it becomes important to consider whether the legislature
are the final and conclusive judges of the existence of the public
use for which private property is authorized to be taken under the
constitution. " The provision in the constitution that no part of
the property of an individual can be taken from him or applied to
public uses without his consent or that of the legislature, and that
where it is appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a just com-
pensation therefor, necessarily implies " observes BIGELOW, 0. J.,
in Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray 421, "1 that it can be taken only for
such a use, and is equivalent to a declaration that it cannot be
taken and appropriated to a purpose in its nature private, or for
the benefit of a few individuals. In this view it is a direct and
positive limitation upon the exercise of legislative power, and an
act which goes beyond this limitation must be unconstitutional and
void. No one can doubt that if the legislature should by statute,
take the property of A. and transfer it to B., it would transcend
its constitutional power. In all cases, therefore, when this power
is exercised, it necessarily involves an inquiry into the rightfil
authority of the legislature under the organic law. But the legis-
lature have no power to determine finally upon the extent of their
authority over private rights. This is a power in its nature essen-
tially judicial, which they are by article 30 of the Declaration of
Rights, expressly forbidden to exercise. The question whether a
statute in a particular instance exceeds the just limits of the con-
stitution must be determined by the judiciary. In no other way
can the rights of the citizen be protected when they are invaded
by legislative acts which go beyond the limitations imposed by the
constitution. In Tyler v. Beecher, 44 Verm. 651, the principle
under discussion was considered by the court and Mr. Justice
WHEELER in delivering the opinion of the court uses the follow-
ing language: "Wherever the use is public the legislature has full
power to determine whether a necessity for taking for such use in
any class of cases exists or not. TRilliams v. School District, 33
Verm. 271. And the legislature has the sole prerogative of
determining as to the propriety of exercising the power it has
upon the necessity that does exist in any class of cases. But the
legislature has not the power to so determine that a use is a public
use or to make the determination conclusive. The attempt there-
fore of the legislature to exercise the right of eminent domain
does not settle that it has the right; but the existence of the
right in the legislature in any class of cases is left to be deter-
mined under the constitution by the courts."
In delivering the opinion of the court in Concord Bailroad v.
Greley, 17 N. H. 47, GILCHRIST, J., in referring to a provision
of the constitution of New Hampshire, similar to that of this state
on this subject, uses the following language: "The words are
ALLEN v. INHABITANTS OF JAY.
very comprehensive. It may include a multitude of objects.
Their construction is a matter of judicial decision; because, how-
ever decided may be the opinion of the legislature that property
in a given case has been taken for a public use, still, whenever the
question arises whether it has been taken, within the meaning of
the constitution, it becomes our duty to determine it. The opinion
of the legislature is not final upon thismore than upon any other
point, where claims, cognisable in this court, depend upon tLe
que-tion whether or not an act of that body is or is not in conflict
with the constitution. Thus, even if the legislature should declare
that an act taking the property of A. and giving it to B. as his
private property, was an application of it to public uses, no one
would contend that such declaration made that public which, in its
nature and object, was private." It is obvious that if the deter-
mination of the legislature that the purpose for which private
property is taken is for a public use, and that the necessity for so
taking it exists, it is conclusive that all property is held subject to
its uncontrolled will. But such it seems is not regarded to be the
law, but it is for the court to determine whether the use for which
property is taken is or is not public.
But to constitute a public use, that will justify the taking of
private property under the constitution, it is not essential that all
portions of the community should derive equal benefit from the
purpose for which the property is taken. It may be taken,
though only portions of the community are thereby benefited.
The line of demarcation between the case when property is taken
for public, and when taken for private purposes, may a -t always
be easily determined. But in the case before us, the removal by
the owners of their mill, and the business connected with it from
one town to another, cannot, under the most liberal construction,
be deemed other than a private matter. It may be a loss to one
town and a gain to another, but the removal is for the private
gain of the persons moving. It is in no respect other than the
moving of one business man with his implements of business from
one place to another.
Neither can it be deemed a public use to raise money from all
the inhabitants of a town to be given, or to be loaned to one of
its number, to be used by him for his individual gain.
The very object of the provision of the statute, under and by
virtue of which this bill is brought, was to prevent the misappro
priation of the funds of a town when collected, or to prohibit the
issuing of bonds hereafter to be paid from the moneys of the same
when collected.
But even if the moving of a new Saw-mill from one town to
another adjacent, or the building of a new grist-mill, the moving
being for the benefit of the owners of the mill, and the building
of time grist mill for the be -efit of the builders. or the giving or
loaning money to produce such results for such purpose, were by
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some strange perversion of language from its ordiiiary acceptation
to be deemed a public use, though the public have no more right
to use it than they have any other property of individuals; and
if by strength of imagination a public exigency could be perceived
in making such change of location and such new erection, or in
giving or loaning for such purposes, and a just compensation could
be found when there is or may be none whatever, and it were to
be deemed a just protection of property that a majority might loan
the property of a minority, or encumber it with debts for private
objects against the will and protestations of such minority, still
the complainants are entitled to have the injunction heretofore
granted made perpetual. The legislature have not said. that the
removal of the new saw-mill of Messrs. Hutchins & Lane, or their
building a grist-mill with one run of stones is for the "public use,"
or is required by any public exigency. But many things may be
for the "benefit" of Jay, and not for public use. Many things
may be for the "benefit" of the people of the state, which are
not required by any existing "public exigency." All the legis-
lature seem to have determined is that Jay affords a better site for
the saw-mill and grist-mill of Messrs. Hutchins & Lane than the
one occupied by them in the town of Livermore.
The Constitution of the State is its paramount and binding law.
The acquisition, possession and protection of property are among
the chief ends of government. To take directly or indirectly the
property of individuals to loan to others for purposes of private
gain and speculation against the consent of those whose money is
thus loaned, would be to withdraw it from the protection of the
Constitution and submit it to the will of an irresponsible majority.
It would be the robbery and spoliation of those whose estates or
a portion of whose estates is thus confiscated. No surer or more
effectual method could be devised to deter from accumulation-to
diminish capital, to render property insecure, and thus to paralyze
industry.
Injunction made perpetual.
TAPLEY, J., dissented.
The foregoing opinion and the still issue bonds, not exceeding $20,000,060,
more recent decision of the Supreme Jn- at five per cent. interest, when payable
dicial Court of Massachusetts, in the case in gold, or six per cent., if payable in
of Lowell v. The City of Boston, seem. to currency. The avails of these bonds to
justify the expectation, that some limits be loaned to the owners of land upon
will hereafter be placed to the power of which buildings were destroyed by the
interested parties through the legislature great fire in November last. Commis-
to carry forward private enterprises by sioners were appointed to manage the
means of taxation. The case of Boston loan, and were required to take a nrsX
grew out of an act of the legislature, at a mortgage upon the land at less thav
specialsession,calledlargelyforthatpur- three-fourths its value, as security for
pose, by which the city was authorized to the money advanced, at seven per cent.
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interest. Here was a case where there
could be no reasonable danger of loss,
and a high probability of some gain to
the city by means of the larger rate of
interest paid by the borrowers than that
paid by the city. There could be no fair
question either that such a proceeding
would afford great accommodation to the
property-owners on the "burnt district,"
and that it would greatly conduce to the
speedy restoration of that portion of the
city, and thus naturally tend to the in-
crease of the wealth and business pros-
perity of the city, and to some extent, to
the greater convenience, accommodation
and prosperity of the inhabitants of the
city generally. And still the court, unan-
imously, so far as we learn, came to
the conclusion, that tht .tatute was void,
and perpetually enjoined all proceedings
under it.
It cannot be denien, we think, by any
one who has examined the question care-
fully, that there is a most alarming dis-
position manifested in all directions,
within the last few years, to take posses-
sion of public money for private uses.
We need not refer to particular instances,
nut everywhere, and as well among the
best men we have as others, there seems to
oe no scruple in appropriating public
money to private uses, provided only it
be done for the good of large numbers.
And there seems no difficulty, anywhere,
in bringing the legislatures into these
views. There remains therefore no secu-
rity wnatever against such abuse of taxa-
tion, except from the restraining power
of the courts. And this is, in some sense,
no doubt, in a popular government, a
somewhat precarious reliance. We do
not here refer so much to the elective
tenure of judicial office as to the innate
difficulty of bringing any class of men
very much above the general public opi-
nion by which they are surrounded.
rhere is, with all thoughtful men, and
none the less among the more highly
cultured, an instinctive tendency to dis-
trust their own opinions, whenever they
find them in conflict with the mass of
opinion by which they are surrounded.
and on the other hand to resr satisfies
with any the most superficial views,
when everybody almost chimes in wit.
loud and enthusiastic acclamations, in
favor of the same views. It las never
seemed to us that this country had suf-
fered so much in the want of indepen.*
ence in its judiciary, from any cringing
or cowardly subservience to popular sen-
timent ; on the mere ground of securing
a re-election to office, by the individual
judges, as in the want of capacity, among
the members of the different tribmials, to
readily and clearly comprehend the nu-
merous and fatal fallacies which, many
times, one might say, almost always.
underlie that popular sentiment, which
is rushing them on to false conclusions.
We do not seem, any of us, to always
bear in mind, how the popular opinion
springs up, even upon what seem to be
great and important public questions.
If a lawyer presents any particular view
to the courts in favor of his client, we
begin by distrusting his whole scheme,
from beginning to end, as the mere make-
shift of an interested party, and withhold
our assent to every proposition lie urges
until compelled to accept it as sound.
But it seems never to occur to us, that
popular opinion, upon most of the great
questions of the day, is created in the
same manner precisely as a lawycr's
argument, except that it is done upon a
more extendcd-a grander scale. When
a company or an individual asks aid
from the taxation of a city, town or
county, we see clearly enough, that such
persons are but interested parties. But
when they are able to point us to the
practice of the whole country, where the
same thing is done almost daily, we do
not seem to comprehend, that all this is
brought about in the samc way, and that
it is only the combination of interested
parties. Few men, judges any more
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than others, like to stand alone in
their opinions. We all like to be able
to quote authority and precedents, in our
support. It requires some firmness and
some self-respect to be able to stand
alone, even in the best of causes. And
to recur to the tenure of judicial office, we
have never been able to see very clearly,
that the judges of the national courts,
all of whom hold office by a permanent
tenure, were any more independent of
political or personal prejudices and pre-
possessions, than the state judges, most
of whom hold office by popular elections
for short terms. Others may see some
l-appy difference in favor of the former.
We have hoped there was, and some-
times argued, that there should be, a
difference in favor of the independence
of the former. But the moment any
case occurs, calculated to call up the
infirmities already referred to, it has
always seemed to us the power to over-
come them was more in the character of
the man, who was called to deal with
such questions, than in the tenure of his
office, and that it depended largely upon
clear preceptions exactly where the truth
lay.
But now that a breach is made upon
this question, and two leading state
courts have advanced far enough to fix
some limit to the definition of "public
use," we hope to find the pendulum of
judicial opinion vibrating still further
in that direction. The difficulty seems,
hitherto, to have been to distinguish
clearly between a "public use" and one
that only remotely contributed to the
public good, by increasing the business,
wealth or prosperity of a town or city.
Public use and public good have been
too often regarded as synonymous terms,
and consequently it has been maintained
by reasonably good lawyers and able
judges, that taxation, which it is con.
ceded on all hands, can only be resorted
to for public uses, mignt be made to con-
tribute to the support of all objects
which conduced to the public good. Rail-
ways have been largely subsidized by
the towns and cities from the public
treasury mainly upon this ground. No-
body, at first certainly, seemed to sup-
pose, that it was competent for towns
and cities to build entire railways, ex-
tending hundreds of miles beyond their
limits ; but everybody seemed to suppose
such towns and cities might contribute
to their creation or maintenance, in pro-
portion to the benefit derived from them.
But finally, the Supreme Court of Ohio,
in Walker v. City of Cincinnati, 21 Ohio
N. S. 14; s. o. 11 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
346, in spite of a constitutional prohibi-
tion against towns and cities " aiding
railway companies" in the construction
of their roads, deliberately declared, that
the defendant was competent, under an
act of the legislature, to build an entire
railway from Cincinnati to Chatanooga,
through portions of three states, at an
expense of ten millions of dollars. No
doubt a railway, within the limits of a
municipality, is a public use for which
taxation may be levied, provided the
work is owned by the town or city. It
has always seemed to us more question-
ble, how far it was competent for towns
and cities to become shareholders in pri-
vate joint stock companies. The less
objectionable mode of contributing aid
towards any such work would seem to
be, to give the money outright. But the
obtaining of shares in the place of the
money gives it the semblance of an in-
vestment, and thus induces many to vote
for aid in this form, looking mainly at
the pecuniary venture, who could not be
as readily induced to favor an outright
gift.
But when the work is extended beyond
the limits of the town or city, and be-
yond the line of the state, there is no
argument in favor ot contribution, by
means of municipal taxation towards its
creation or maintenance, which can rest
upon any other plausible ground, except
that of the public good, in the broad
ense of general improvement in wealth
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and business, as well as population and
other kindred modes of general advance-
ment. And this argument, if we com-
prehend the matter rightly, applies
equally well in favor of both the projects
embracLd in the cases stated in this note ;
the one for erecting a saw-mill, box-
factory and grist-mill, and the other for
advancing twenty millions, for building
the city of Boston. And still these pro-
jects were, no doubt, justly pronounced
merely private enterprises. The propo-
sition seems too obvious to admit of
much argument that they are as merely
private as any others, conceivable. It
is as much a private business in this
country, certainly, as any other, to carry
on mills. There wasa time, when mills
for grinding, in England, possessed
something of public support, more than
was extended to other business. In some
places the tenants were bound to have
their corn, which embraced all kinds of
grain, ground at the lord's mill: Vin.
Ab. tit. Xill. And the lord might pre-
scribe against any other one building a
mill : Com. Dig. tit. Droit, II. Bulst.
195. Actions were maintained for not
grinding at the mill of the plaintiff, ac-
cording to custom: Coryton v. Lithebye,
2 Saund. 112; nortv. Birkbeck, 1 Doug.
208 ; Rex v. Burdett, 1 Ld. Ray. 148.
And at one time, by statutes, called the
Mill Acts, the Hundred was made respon-
sible for any damage done by the mob to
mills, or to the machinery: Rushforth v.
Beatson, I Price 343; s. c. 3 Price 48;
s. c. 7 Taunt. 45. Markets and fairs,
too, were in England, and are here also
held to be a kind of public institution.
We are not aware that mills here have
any public character, more than tanning
or any other business. But we appre-
hend that the Mill Acts in this country,
and the decisions of the courts in some
states, have given countenance to the
belief, that water-mills were a sort of
publi- use, where the legislature might
interfere and control them on public
grounds, different from those applicable
to other property. This has resulted, no
doubt, from tile courts attempting to vin-
dicate the constitutionality of Mill Acts
on the ground of "taking private pro-
perty for public use," by right of emi-
nent domain, as it is called. This view
has been maintained, very extensively,
in the more recent decisions upon this
question, by very able courts and eni-
nent judges. This is the ground upon
which the Connecticut cases are placed :
Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Todd
v. Austin, 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 9.
The same is true in New Hampshire:
Great Falls Man. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.
H. 444; Ash v. C'uminags, 50 Id. 591.
So, also, in some of the later cases in
Massachusetts: Hazen v. Fssex Co., 12
Cush. 475 ; Tdlot v. THudson, 16 Gray
417. There are many other cases in the
same direction, probably; and on the
other hand some of the states have repu-
diated these mill laws, on the ground
that, being only a private use, it will
not justify the exercise of the right of
eminent domain : Fisher v. Horicon Co.,
10 Wise. 351 ; Curtis v. Widpple, 24 Id.
350; lloore v. Wright, 34 Alab. 311,
and a case in Vermont not yet- reported.
There may be others. We should be
surprised if they did not very soon out-
number and override those in favor of
these acts, unless there can be found
some more satisfactory ground upon
which to place their constitutionality.
If the right of eminent domain exists in
favor of mills, it must be upon the more
ground of their public utility. Thig be-
ing admitted, it will seem to some rather
difficult to distinguish the principal cate,
so that it will not fall into the same cate-
gory of public utility and thus justify
taxation. But we consider the argument
of tile learned Chief Justice moot over-
whelming and unanswerable in favor of
a mill or manufactory, owned and ope-
rated by a private company, or natural
persons, for tlcir own emolument, be-
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log regarded as a strictly private use for
which neither the right 3f taxation or of
eminent domain can )e lawfully exer-
cised. We must, therefore, seek some
other ground to justify the Mill Acts, or
they will be overturned by the principles
upon which this casu rests. And it has
always seemed to us that the ground
upon which the Mill Acts were placed
by Ckief Justice SHAw, in Fiske v.
1'rnmingham 31nn. Co., 12 Pick. 68, was
far more satisfactory than that of emi-
nent domain. "We think," says the
learned judge, "they will be found to
rest for their justificati-n, partly upon
the interest which the community at
large has in the use and employment of
mills, and partly upon the nature of the
property, which is often so situated that
it could not be beneficially used without
the aid of this power." This cannot
surely refer to the sovereign right of
eminent domain, which, when it exists,
is absolute and uncontrollable, and needs
no supplementing from "the nature of
the property," or any other source.
Sovereign power disclaims all aid, and,
.vhere it exists, requires none. It is a
zorrelative of some public duty, like
,hat of furnishing highways for inter-
communication, the administration of
public justice, both civil and criminal;
'he naking of laws and their execution;
pub ic education ; the administration of
tho police and of punishment under the
criminal laws; the public health; supply-
ing towns and cities with pure water;
the postal service and the public defence;
and some others of like nature. These
are all public uses, for which taxation
may be lawfully imposed, and the right
.f eminent domain exercised by that
Jepirtment of the government, state or
national, upon which the public duty
rests. Hence nothing can fairly be re-
garded as a "public use," unless it be
a state use, or a national use, in further-
ance of a state or national duty. The
same eminent judge last quoted said, in
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Murdock v. Stickney, 8 Cash. 113, "The
principle upon which the Mill Act is
founded is not, as has sometimes been
supposed, the right of eminent domain,
the sovereign right of taking private
property for public use." The right
of eminent domain is not called into
service in the accomplishment of all
public duties which have to be carried
forward by taxation. There must be
some exigency requiring the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, in order to
justify it. Hence the building of school-
houses, court-houses, jails, penitentia-
ries and hospitals do not ordinarily re-
quire its exercise, since the proper sites
may commonly be obtained without such
exercise. But whenever it becomes
necessary to resort to its exercise, in
order to obtain the proper site for a
school-house, this right maybe invoked:
Williams v. School District, 33 Vt. 278;
Hooper v. Bridgewater, 102 Mass. 512.
And the same will, no doubt, hold true
in regard to the site of other public
buildings.
But the right of eminent domain can
never be exercised for any merely pri-
vate purpose, however much the public
utility or convenience may be subserved
thereby. The owner of one rood of land
may stand in the way of any private en-
terprise, however much the general uti-
lity may be thereby hindered, and no
human power, in a free country, where
the principles of Magna Charta prevail in
their full force, can compel him to budge
one step. So, too, all the private wealth
of a town or city may ignobly shut itself
up and absolutely refuse to advance one
pent for the encouragement of manufac-
tures, the arts, commerce or navigation,
and thus greatly hinder the growth of
such town or city, and no earthly power
can compel the proprietors of such wealth
to give one cent for the advancement of
those enterprises, which the majority
may deem matters of the greatest public
concern. We say so now, since these
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decisions seem to justify such a declara-
tion. We know it will cut off one very
convenient form of compelling public spi-
rit. But what the countr- loses in that
way it will more than gain compensation
for in the quiet security of person and
property thereby obtained.
eV scarcely need to resort to the de-
finition of public use as opposed to pri-
vate use. But the terms "1 public use"
are, no doubt, used in the American
constitutions, both state and national, in
their original and natural sense, as de-
fined by the lexicographers. Ttus John-
son defines piblic, as "belonging to a
state or nation." and Web-ter expresses
it, as " pertaining to a state, natio, or
comnmunity." Thus we all underqtand'
public property, as that which belon,.:- to
the state or nation, in opposition to pri-
vate property, which embraces that which
belongs to private persons, natural or
artificial. Thus public law means the
law pertaining to nations, and private
law that which pertains to private per-
sons, and public way mean- one open to
the use of all, and private way, one
owned by private person-. And by the
same rule a "public use" must import
what is for the u-e of the state or nation
or all its inhabitants, as opposed to pri-
vate use, which is confined to particular
persons, natural or corporate. And the
riaht of eminent domain or of taxation,
it is conceded on all hanu., can only be
exercised for some Ipuhlic use." And
by public use is here meant, as we have
already shown, some use uwhich helongs
- the state or nation, or to those upon
whom the state or nation have devolved
this public use as a town, county or city ;
or, in the case of railways and canals, a
corporation created for the express pur-
pose of carrying the public use or public
dity into effect. Thus it will appear that
the right of eminent domain can never
he exercised except hy the state, for tite
aec ompli_-hment of the performance of
if.s own duties, or else by those upon whom
public duties have been expressly devolv
ed by the legislattre. And in neither
case can this right be exercised except
when there is a necessity for its exercise
or as expressed in the constitution of the
state of Maine, "nor unless the public
exigencies require it." The same limi-
tation undoubtedly will be fountd in the
constitutions of other states. And even
where not so expressed it is nlways im-
plied, that private property is not to be
taken in any ease except from necessity.
or some public exigency demanlit,, it.
But nothing of this kind can fairly be
said to apply to mills of any kint. They
are no more public institutitns than any
other kind of bnsiness. The very per-
sons who justify the exercise of eminent
aomain by the state in their belhalf. on
the ground that it is for a public use,
would scarcely justify the building of
mills by taxation, and then allowing
them to be operated by private persons
for their own benefit ; still les would
they ju-tify the state it allowin- towns
and cities to build and operate mills at
the pbhlic expense. And yet it seems
now to be noy,.etded. that the puhlte use
to ju-tify taxation mut be the same, in
principle at leat, althotgh not always
the same in the particular instance, as
that public tie wihich will justify tle ex-
ercise of the right of eminent domain :
Coinaqfon v. S,,,,thyats, 15 B. \louroe
491 ; Grrerdl (ounty Court v. Kteno,'k*
NXt,. Co.. 1t Am. Law Reg. X. S. 151 :
Opinion of the Judges, 58 Me. 590.
We must then seek for the jus:ification
of these Mill Acts from some othet
source. Ani this will le found, irat all.
in the nature of the property in water-
power or mill privileges. It is, i:t sotre
sense, peculiar and in others quite ana-
logous to that of property owned in joint
tenancy, or as teuants ilt contnon. One
may own the hind upon one side of the
stream, anti antltr a 'uv own the oppo
site side. Ote may not de-ire to iml,rove
his water-power, and may refuse te sell
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or lease to the other. Unless, therefore,
i-ne legislature may pass laws, enabling
the owner upon one side of the stream to
rest his dam upon the land of the oppo-
site owner, he cannot enjoy the use of
nis own estate for its most important
advantages. And as the owners of the
opposite sides of a stream are regarded,
ir the nature of tenants in common of
th3 use of the water, there is no more
wrong or hardship in compelling one
tnant of the use to surrender his inte-
rest to the other, than in any statute,
compelling a severance of the estates of
tenants in common, in lands or tene-
ments, by assigning all to one, or mak-
ing a public sale of the property, which
are but the ordinary provisions of such
statutes, found in all or nearly all the
states. And again, most water-powers
require both a head and fall in order to
create the requisite force. One may own
the fall, and have no title to the land
,ndispensable to make the proper head to
render the fall available for any mill pur-
poses. There is, therefore, no more
violation of principle in combining these
two interests for use, than in combining
or separating the estates of tenants in
common of the same property for the
same end. It has never been questioned
that the legislature may regulate the
rights or uses of riparian owners upon
streams or lakes in its discretion, so as
to advance the value of the estate, by
defining the mode of occupancy. But
this right rests, most unquestionably,
upon the nature of the property and the
fact, that there must, of necessity, be a
kind of joint use, that of one riparian
owner affecting all below him. And the
same will be found true in regard to all
property, where the manner of use af-
fects other property owners or the puh-
lic. Thus the legislature may regulate
the quality and height of fences between
adjoining owners or adjoining the high-
ways, but no one will claim that this
rests upon any right of eminent domain,
or that the legislature could properly
prescribe the mode of fencing land, where
only the interest of the owner was con-
cerned. The right to regulate the use
of land affecting water-powers must rest,
therefore, upon the fact, that all land
affected by the exercise of the power is a
kind of joint estate, which could not be
made available for any profitoble use,
where each proprietor was allowed to act
wholly independent of the other joint
owners. Hence there arises an absolute
necessity for the interference of the law-
making power, to enable the separate
owners to combine their estates so as to
render the property most useful.
There is another ground upon which
these mill laws have been attempted to
be justified, viz., that the legislature had
the power to prescribe special remedies
in all cases where the nature of the pro-
perty required it. This is done, some-
times, in regard to shade or fruit trees,
or glass in buildings, and many other
kinds of property specially exposed to
damages. And there is no question
the legislature may provide more strin-
gent statutory remedies in any special
class of cases demanding such provision.
And we suppose no lawyer will be pre-
pared to say these special remedies may
not be made exclusive of all others.
And we see no reason why it may not
be equally competent for the legislature
to provide special remedies for any act
done by way of enlargement of a water-
power, and make such remedy exclusive
of all others. If so, these Mill Acts
may be sufficiently vindicated upon this
ground alone. But we should prefer to
place their validity upon the two grounds
jointly ; that from the ;oint nature of
the property there arose a necessity for
legislative interference, in order to the
full enjoyment of the property, and also
to make the remedies thus provided ex-
clusive of all others, in order to prevent
confusion by different remedies of a con-
flicting character. This is not very d'f
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ferent from a statute forbidding repeated
suits for trespasses by the same party on
the same land, of the propriety of which
there can be no question, since courts of
equity will decree the same on general
principles, but a court of law could not
enforce the rule without a statutory pro-
vision.
We have thus sufficiently shown theim-
propriety of invoking the reserved rights
of the state to apply private property to
punlic use in order to justify the Mill
Acts, as they are called ; since this is in
no sense a public use, and the acts are
sufficientlyjustified upon general grounds
of legislative authority. We trust there
will not, therefore, be any repugnance
felt to the two decisions we are com-
menting upon, because they leave no
ground for the Mill Acts to stand upon.
We hope, too, that we have sufficiently
shown that a public use sufficient to
justify either taxation or the taking of
private property on compensation, must
be for the accomplishment of some duty
resting primarily upon the state or na-
tion. We shall not further discuss the
question, how far the delegation of these
public duties to private corp6rations,
such as railway and canal companies,
will carry the right to uphold them by
taxation. It will, no, doubt, justify the
exercise of the right of eminent domain,
and hence, we think unjustly, most of
our courts have concluded the right of
taxation might be exercised on their be-
half. The very fact of committing these
public trusts to private companies seems
to imply that they are to be carried for-
ward by the money of such companies.
No dolbt, the state or nation may sub-
sidize such companies. But the attempt
to do this by allowing the municipalities
to become members of these private com-
panies must surely be an anomaly, and
we look for some period to arrive when
the courts-will so regard it. We look
upon these decisions as having removed
the principal grounds upon which build-
ing railvays by taxation has been
hitherto justified, viz., that it was apply-
ing the money to a public use, which a
private railway is not, in the sense of the
American constitutions, at least so far
as taxation is concerned, which should
never be resorted to for upholding a pri-
vate enterprise.
We need not attempt to add to the
argument in the principal case, to show
that if "Ipublic use" embraces all uses,
which conduce to the public good, it will
extend to all businesses in the country,
since none other could be maintained,
and thus throw all private property into
the public treasury, to be redistributed
at the pleasure of the legislature, a state
of things no one will justify, even in
argument. I. F. R.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
BOSTON AND ALBANY RAILROAD COMPANY v. SHANLY ET AL.
CARNEY v. SA3E.
An action may be maintained by a common carrier against a person knowingly
sending by such carrier explosive and dangerous articles, recently discovered and
manufactured, not known to the carrier to be such, and without notice of their
character, for any damages caused by the explosion thereof from their inherent
tendency to explode or improper packing.
But not against a person who merely orders the same to be so sent as a pur-
chaser, although he gives no such notice.
If two persons, without any concert or knowledge of each other's acts, so send
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.wo such articles, one of which causes the explosion of the other, an action may
be maintained against them jointly.
A third person, whose property near the railroad is injured by the explosion,
may also maintain such action.
IF the action is brought in the name of the third person for the benefit of the
carrier as assignee, this is no ground for demurrer.
THESE were actions of tort for injury by an explosion on a train
of the railroad company in Worcester, Mass., which damaged cars
and property on the train and in the neighborhood to a large
amount. It appeared that an explosive substance called "dualin,"
and a box of articles used to explode the same, were on the same
car of the train, and these actions were brought against the parties
concerned in ordering, manufacturing and sending them.
The first action was by the company for damages to their cars
and other property.
The second action was in the name of the owner of a building
and other property in the neighborhood, alleged to have been
injured, but the action was brought for the use of the plaintiffs in
the first, as assignees of Carney.
Demurrers were filed on the ground that the declarations did
not allege any legal cause of action or any joint tort or negligence
participated in by the parties demurring; that the allegation of
damage was too indefinite; that the plaintiff's own negligence con-
tributed to the injury; and in Carney's case, on the ground, also,
that it appeared that the plaintiff had been paid by the railroad
company, which now sued to recover the amount paid him for their
own negligence; that they could not sue in his name for their own
benefit, and that no facts were set forth to show that the cause of
action was assignable.
George S. Hale, for the plaintiffs.
J T. Perr and W. L .. Endicott, for the Oriental Powder
Company and cthers, charged with sending the exploders.
Charles Allen, for the Shanlys.
George Sennott, for Burkhardt and the Dittmars.
Hale cited as to the maintenance of the actions in general:
Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567; Wellington v. -Downer Kerosene
Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64; Addison on Torts 16; St. 29 & 30 Vict.
ch. 39 ; Williams v. East .India Co., 3 East 192; Lanqmaid v
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Ifolliday, 6 Exch. 761-767; Brass v. .1laitl nd, 6 El. & B11. 47-
Hutchinson v. Guion. 5 0. B. N. S. 149; Farrant v. Barnes, J
fd. 553; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397; Pierce v. W1rinso
2 Clifford 18; Penton v. 1Aburdock, 2 Law Times N. S. 87
Illege v. Goodoin, 5 C. & P. 190.
As to the joint liability of the parties: Lynch v. hurdin, 1 '.
B. 35; 1 A. & E., N. S. 29; aolegrove v. . .,J-. .H. ft., Co'.
20 N. Y. 492; Thorogood v. Brtan, 8 0. B., M. Gr. & S. 11;::
Hawkesworth v. Thompson, 98 Mass. 77 ; Eaton v. Bost. J- Lo)'.
R. R. Co., 11 Allen 500; Abbott v. 3cRie. 2 11. & C. 74;
Stone v. Dickinson, 5 Allen 29.
As to the liability of the Shanlys particularly, he contended
follows:I Taking the respective defendants in two classes, whi(.
may be called the "Dualins" and the "Exploders"-t1c.
"Dualins" consist of the Shaulys, who gave express orders to
have the dualin manufactured, and sent by the plaintiff's rov 1,
knowing its dangerous qualities, without warning or notice to
the plaintiff, and the Dittmars, and Burkhardt, who manufactur .d
it, and knowing its qualities, delivered it, without notice, represe 1-
ing that it was safe, for the Shanlys and at their request, to '0
carried to them by the carriers selected and designated by them.
The "Exploders" consist of the Sbanlys, who gave a simi"
order as to the exploders, with like knowledge and concealnent
their qualities, and the Powder Company, who by its specific o
cers and agents prepared them, and in conformity with the ord.
knowing their dangerous qualities, delivered them as is alleg(
without notice, and representing that they were safe.
The Shanlys gave express orders that the Dualin should
manufactured for them, and sent to them over the plaintiff's ro"
On g2neral principles and under the cases already cited, they
liable.
Th,,y set in motion the dangerous article, knowing its qualiti(
and there was a natural and probable connection between tb
wrong done by them, and the injurious consequences which have f('
lowed: Lynch v. .Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 36; OJlcDonald v. Snelling, I
Allen 290; Scott v. Hunter, 46 Penn. St. R. 192; Thomas
Winc'hester, 6 N. Y. 397. If A. orders B. to commit a trespass, 1
is jointly liable with B.: Com. Dig. Trespass, c. 1 ; Dicey on Par-
This portion of the argument is given more at length as the court held
them not liable.
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ies 440; Robin8on v. lFaughton, 8 0. & P. 252, 255. So h,-
nust be when he orders B. to place or send dangerous goods wher-
they may injure third persons, as much as if he sold them to b .
resold: Wellington v. -Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64. 1I
this case the other defendants were the agents of the Shanlys in
delivering the dualia for carriage to the carrier indicated by them.
In the language of GIBSON, C. J., in Griffith v. L:gldeu,, 6 S.
& R. 437: "Where goods are delivered to a carrier, pursuant to
an order of the vendee, who has not himself settled the terms, the
vendor, where he makes a special agreement with the carrier, with-
out expressly making himself liable, will be considered as having
contracted, as the agent, and in behalf of the vendee; for the
order necessarily includes the ancillary power to make such a con-
tract, without which such order could not perhaps be executed;
and, therefore, where the carrier does not enter into the contract,
on the personal guarantee of the vendor, he will be considered as
looking to the vendee, between whom and himself there is suffi-
cient privity of contract and mutuality of remedy to give either an
action on the agreement."
The Shanlys alone, on the facts alleged on the declaration, could
maintain an action for the goods or be sued for the freight.
In Dicey on Parties to an Action 87, the author says: "1st.
The contract for carriage is, in the absence of any express agree-
ment, presumed to be between the carrier and the person at whose
risk the goods are carried, i. e., the person whose goods they are
and who would suffer if the goods were lost. This person is
ordinarily the consignee; for when, as is often the case, he is the
purchaser of the goods, delivery of the goods by the vendor to the
carrier, operates as delivery to the purchaser or the consignee.
It is for him the goods are carried, and the consignor in employing
the carrier, is considered as agent of the consignee for that pur-
pose." See also Powell on Carriers 207, 208; Angell on
Carriers, §§ 495, 497, 499; Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray 281,
287-800.
So, had the Shanlys sued for damages to the same goods, evi
dence that the damage arose from their peculiar nature (unknown
and not communicated to the defendants), which required certain
precautions in stowage, would have defeated the claim: Hutchin-
eon v. Guion, 5 0. B. N. S. 149.
In Farrant v. Barnes, 11 C. B. N. S. 553, the defendant's fore-
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man requested one R., the servant of a carrier, P., to forward the
vitriol; but being unable to take it, R. applied to the plaintiff, the
servant of another carrier, to take it for him; and it is submitted
that the Shanlys are within the same liability, and as nearly
connected with the transaction. They ordered and requested the
other defendants to forward the explosive articles by means of
the plaintiff's cars.
In Herne v. Garton, 2 El. & El. 64, where the respondents to
a complaint for sending dangerous goods had received them from
one N., and being misled by him did not give notice of their
character, while they were held not liable criminally for want of
guilty knowledge, it was thought they might have been liable
civilly; and CROMPTON, J., said, p. 75, "It was N. who sent these
goods knowingly. . . . I think that N. would probably be
liable under the act." Lord CAMPBELL gave no opinion as to this.
The case seems to show that the goods were N.'s and given by
him to the respondents to be forwarded, and that he was present
at the delivery to the carrier.
As to damages, he cited: Sedgwick on Damages 109; Dixon
v. Bell, 1 Stark. 228; Richardson v. Chasen, 10 Ad. & El. N. S.
756
The counsel for the defendants cited: Brass v. llaitland, 6 El. &
B1. 470; Davidson v. Nichols, 8 Allen 75; 11 Allen 514; V.an
Steenburg v, Tobias, 17 Wend. 562; Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt. 9:
Auchmity v. Ham, 1 Denio 495; Williams v. Sheldon, 10 Wend.
654 ; Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 ; Russell v. Tomlinson, 2 Conn.
206; Coryton v. Lithebye, 2 Saunders 117 a, 117 b, notes by Wil-
liams; Buddington v. Shearer, 20 Pick. 479; Parsons v. IVinchell,
5 Cush. 592; Albro v. Jaquette, 4 Gray 99; Colegrovev. N. Y. N.
H. Railroad Co., 6 Duer 382; 20 N. Y. 493; DUER, J., dissenting
opinion, 6 Duer 419 ; Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass. 507 ; Flower v.
Adams, 2 Taunt. 314; Tutein v. Husley, 98 Mass. 211; Thomas v.
Winchester, 2 Selden 397 ; Wellingtonv. Downer Kerosene Co., 104
Mass. 64; Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 M., G. & S. 115; Lockhart v.
Leichtenthaler, 46 Penn. St. 151; Cleveland Railroad Co. v.
Terry, 8 Ohio 570; Peterbaugqh v. Reason, 9 Ohio St. 34; Brown
v. N. Y. Central Railroad Co., 31 Barb. 335; 2 Redf. Railw.
196, 3d ed.; Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621 ; Lamb v. Crafts, 12
Met. 356 ; Gardner v. Joy, 9 Id. 177 ; Addison on Torts, 3d
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ed. 393-395 ; Butler v. Hunter, 7 H. & N. 826 ; Sadler v. Hen-
lock. 4 El. & B1. 578 ; Beedie v. London, fc., Railway, .4 Exch.
255; Bell on Contracts of Sale 84, 86, 87, 89; 2 Kent Com.
500; Story on Sales (4th ed.), §§ 305, 388, 390; Brown on
Sales, §§ 523, 525, 526; 1 Parsons's Cont. (5th ed.) 532, 533;
Benjamin on Sales 515 ; Judson v. Western Railroad Co., 4 Allen
520; Norway Plains Co. v. B & X. Railroad, 1 Gray 275;
Clark v. Hutchins, 14 East 475; Buckman v. Levi, 3 Camp. 414:
Finn v. Clark, 10 Allen 479 ; 12 Id. 522 ; Finn v. W. Bailroa I
Corp., 102 Mass. 283-288, 289-290; 2 Redf. on Railw., § 17(,
art. 4; Redf. on Carriers, § 135; C6ombs v. Br. & .Ex. Rai'.
road Co., 3 H. & N. 6, by WATSON, B. ; Hudson v. Baxendale,
H. & N. 575 ; Addison on Con. 480 ; Wood v. Cobb, 13 Alle
59 ; Forsyth v. Hoover, 11 Allen 419, 421 ; Brackett v. Lubk
4 Id. 138 ; Linton v. Smith, 8 Gray 147 ; Hilliard v. Richarc
son, 3 Id. 349; Coomes v. Houghton, 102 Mass. 213; Quarma
v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499; Milligan v. Wedge, 12 Ad. & E
737; Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 713 ; Story on Agency (Red.
ed.) § 452 b.; Williams v. East India Co., 3 East 192; Farrai:
v. Barnes, 11 0. B. N. S. 553; Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 56E;
Herne v. Garton, 2 El. & El. 66 ; Pierce v. Winsor, 2 Spragt 1
36; s. a. 2 Clifford 18; Addison on Con. (6th ed.) 470; Add
son on Torts (3d ed.) 16, 407, 451, 455, 456 ; Walker v. Jackso,
10 M. & W. 161 ; Putnam v. Tillotson, 13 Met. 517 ; Merchant.,
National Bank v. Banks, 102 Mass. 295; Gilman v. .Eastei ,
Railroad, 10 Allen 236, 237; s. c. 13 Id. 440; -elch v. Alle
98 Mass. 572; Seaver v. Boston . Maine Railroad, 14 Gray 46(
Smith's Master and Servant (3d ed.) 107, 108; Story on Agenc
§§ 217, 308 ; Met. on Con. 11 ; Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 594
Bewett v. Swift, 3 Allen 425; Campbell v. Phelps, 1 Pick. 62.
The opinion of the court in the first case was delivered by
CHAPMAN, 0. J.-This case comes before us upon a demurre
to the plaintiffs' declaration. The action is against Walter an(!
Francis Shanly, of North Adams, Hugo and Carl Dittmars, anao
Gottlieb F. Burkhardt, of Boston, and The Oriental Powder Com-
pany, a corporation established in Boston, and Jackson, Newhall,
Smith and Hurds, of Boston, the officers or agents of the company
The first count alleges that the plaintiffs are common carriers,
between Boston and North Adams, upon their own railroad from
VOL. XXI-33.
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Boston to Pittsfield; and thence to North Adams upon the Pitts.
field and North Adams Railroad, of which they are lessees; that
said Dittmars and Burkhardt manufactured for said Shanlys, at
their request, as well as for other persons, a new dangerous ex-
plosive, combustible and inflammable substance, called by a new
name not generally known (but afterwards called dualhn in the
declaration), now in the market; and the qualities not generally
known, and made in part of nitro-glycerine, which is of itself an
explosive and dangerous substance; that the Oriental Powder
Company and its said officers and agents also manufactured for
the Shanlys, at their request, as well as for other persons, certain
dangerous articles called exploders, designed to be used for explod-
ing said new compound; that the Shanlys, knowing the dangerous
character of said compound, and of said exploders, ordered and
requested said Dittmars and Burkhardt to send to them at North
Adams, in the plaintiffs' cars, a quantity of said compound, and
ordered and requested the said Oriental Powder Company to send
them in the same way a quantity of said exploders, but gave no
notice to the plaintiffs of the dangerous character of either of said
articles; that the Dittmars and Burkhardt sent ten cases of the
compound, and delivered them to the plaintiffs as ten cases of
dualin, knowing them to be of a dangerous character, but did not
give notice to the plaintiffs, nor did the plaintiffs know of their
dangerous character, but the Dittmars and Burkhardt declared that
they were safe and not of a dangerous character; that the Oriental
Powder Company and their said officers and agents sent two hun-
dred pounds of exploders accordingly, but packed them in an
improper and dangerous manner, and gave the plaintiffs no notice
of their dangerous character, but delivered them as "one box,"
and the plaintiffs did not know of their dangerous character; that
the dualin and exploders did, by reason of their nature and im-
proper packing, take fire and explode, and the exploders taking
fire and exploding, caused the dualin to explode, and this taking
fire and exploding, both separately and by the combination
tbereef, destroyed sundry cars and other property of the plaintiffs,
and other goods which they had as carriers, and for which they
were liable to pay.
Both the dualin and the exploders are thus alleged to be explo-
sive and dangerous articles. Each of them was sent without giv.
img notice of its character to the plaintiffs, and they were ignorant
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in respect to it. The rule of law on this subject is in conformity
with the dictates of common sense and justice, and is well estab-
lished. One who has in his possession a dangerous article, which
he desires to send to another, may send it by a common carrier if
he will take it; but it is his duty to give him notice of-its charac-
ter, so that he may either refuse to take it or be enabled, if he
takes it, to make suitable provision against the danger. The rea-
son for requiring~this notice is still stronger, if other persons would
be exposed to danger from it, but the duty is the same. This
,principle is established in application to the sending of goods by
carriers in Williams v. liaat India 0o.,- 3 East 192 see also
_Brass v. Maitland, 10 El. & B1. 470; Farrant v. Barnes, 11 0.
B. 557.
The duty does not arise from any contract express or implied,
but from the principle expressed in the maxim, Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non ioedas. The principle is held by this court in its
broadest signification. In Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567, it was
held that a trader who sold gunpowder to a boy eight years of age,
who had no knowledge or experience in the use of it, and was unfit
to be t-asted with it, and injured himself afterwards by its explo-
sion, was liable to an action for the damage. In Wellington v.
Downer -Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64, an action was maintained
against a retailer of fluids, for knowingly selling naphtha, a dan-
gerous article, to be burnt in a lamp, the plaintiff being ignorant
of its qualities. There are numerous cases which sustain this
principle in various forms, but these are sufficient for its illustra-
tion.
This principle is not changed by the alleged fact that the Shan-
lys requested the Dittmars and Burkhardt to manufacture a quan-
tity of the dualin in an unusually dangerous manner, and that they
did so manufacture it. If it was a dangerous article, the duty of
the sender was to give the notice, and if it was so in an unusual
degree that fact only made the duty more important.
But assuming that these parties were guilty of a violation of
duty as alleged, it is yet contended that the manufacturers of the
dualin and the manufacturers of the exploders cannot he joined in
one action for the injury. It is not alleged that these parties
acted in concert in making the several articles, or placing their
respective articles in the plaintiff's care, nor even that they had
knowledge of each other's proceedings. Each acted separately in
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sending goods and omitting to give notice. But each party vin.
lated his duty none the less because lie was ignorant as to what
other articles were to be carried in the same car with his. Bv
neglecting to give the notice, he took the risk of any danger that
might reasonably be apprehended from the proximity of other
goods that the carrier might take in ignorance of the danger. If
as the declaration imports, dualin and exploders are ordinarily
used together, any person sending either of the two substances
might reasonably apprehend the possibility that a quantity of the
other substances might be carried with it. Nor is it material which
of the articles caused the other to be ignited. Practically, a
single injury was produced, and it is impossible to distinguish how
much of it was actually produced by the exploders and how much
by the dualin.
The defendants cite a remark of Chief-Justice SHAw in Marble
v. Worcester, 4 Gray 897, which, if they interpret it correctly,
would leave a w-rongdoer to injure others with impunity if other
wrongdoers were guilty of independent acts that contributed to
produce the same injury.
But the Chief Justice himself applied the remark to the case
before him, which was an action upon a statute against towns;
and the case is to be limited in its application, to actions against
towns: Mc.Donald v. Snelling, 14 Allen 2.90.
They also contend that the case is like those where it is held
that a joint action will not lie against the several owners of dogs
which have together worried a flock of sheep, each owner being
separately liable for the damage done by his own dog: Buddington
v. Shearer, 20 Pick. 477; Van Steenburg v. Tobias, 17 Wend.
562; Auchmuty v. Ham, 1 Denio 495; Russell v. Tomlinson, 2
Conn. 206.
But in such cases there is no concurrence of interest or action
among the several owners of the animals in producing the same
injury. A person's responsibility for the act of his dog arises from
the fact of ownership, and rests on different ground from that of
his responsibility for the physical action of a chemical or mechan-
ical substance prepared and sent by him, or of a nuisance which
he had so placed as that it will occasion injury to others. Tins
act is the direct cause of the injury done by such means. In this
case the parties who wrongfully sent the dangerous substances
were contributors to the catastrophe as much as if they had sepa-
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tely contributed to the raising of a pile of offal which occasioned
i offensive odor, or had at one time separately fired a building by
istinct torches, each of which contributed to a conflagration of the
,;hole. It cannot be that because the several wrongdoers have so
ontributed to the injury that it is impossible to distinguish what
portion of it was caused by each, therefore they can escape with
impunity. On the contrary, each is liable for the whole. The
case is similar to Stone v. Dickinson, 5 Allen 29, and 7 Id. 260,
where several creditors of Stone brought actions against him, and
each caused him to be imprisoned for the same space of time.
The injury being one, it ivas held that though there had been no
concert between them, he could maintain one action against all,
and each was liable for the whole damage. The same doctrine was
held in -Ellis v. Howard, 17 Vt. 330. The many ways in which
wrongdoers may injure another give rise to some nice distinctiois,
but when their several acts directly contribute to produce a single
injury, each being sufficient to have caused the whole, and it is
impossible to distinguish the portions of injury caused by each,
that concurrence ought to render each of them liable for the whole
in a joint action. On this ground, the manufacturers who sent
the articles are jointly liable in this action.
The liability of the Shanlys depends upon their concurrence in
the tortious acts of the other defendants. The declaration cannot
be fairly construed as alleging that the manufacturers were their
servants or agents. It is alleged that they were manufacturers of
the dangerous articles for the Shanlys and others.
The allegation that the Shanlys ordered and requested each of
them to send a specified quantity of these articles to them by the
plaintiffs' railroad, imports an order from a purchaser such as is
usually given by purchasers to manufacturers. If the articles
were required in the order to be of unusual strength, this is not
unlike the order for spirits of unusual strength, or cloth of unusual
weight or fineness, or peculiar color, and does not change the na-
ture of the transaction. Nor does it imply a request that the
goods should be carelessly or improperly packed, or that there
should be any neglect to give such notice to the carriers as would
be proper. If nothing was said on these subjects, it would bt
implied that the packing and whatever else was proper, including
notices and directions, should be properly attended to.
It being the duty of the senders to give proper notice of the
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character of the goods to the carrier, the question arises whether
it was also the duty of- the consignee to give such notice. There
is no authority for holding him to be thus liable, and it would be
useless and unreasonable to require it of him. It should be given
at or about the time of offering him the goods. The consignee is
not likely to know the time, especially if he lives at a distance;
nor is he likely to know what articles may be sent together; nor
is there any occasion to send an additional notice, it being the
duty of the consignor to give notice. In this case it is not alleged
that the Shanlys requested the consignors to neglect any duty
or conceal aly fact, and there is no ground to hold them respon-
sible for the negligence or improper conduct of the other defend-
ants.
[In the second case we give only so much of the opinion as
refers to the point not made in the first.]
CHAPMAN, C. J. [After disposing of various grounds of de-
murrer by reference to the foregoing opinion.]-The fourth cause
of demurrer assigned alleges that it appears from the plaintiff's
writ and declaration that the plaintiff has received full compensa-
tion for all the damages suffered by him, and that the Boston and
Albany Railroad Company have paid him, and sue in his name to
recover back the amount so paid by them; and the defendants
show that if the Boston and Albany Railroad Company have paid
said damages to the plaintiff, it was because their negligence had
rendered them liable to pay him, and if they were negligent and
liable to pay him, he cannot maintain this action. This statement
includes an alleged cause of demurrer, and an argument. It is
sufficient to say in respect to it, that the writ merely alleges that
the action is brought for the benefit of the Boston and Albany Rail-
road Company as assignees. This does not imply any fault or
liability on the part of the assignees. The assignment may have
been made for a variety of reasons. The allegati6n in the writ is
mere surplusage; it can only operate as a notice of such equitable
rights as the assignment may confer; nor is the allegation in the
writ mentioned as a cause of demurrer.
In both cases the demurrer of the Shanlys is sustained, and
the demurrers of the other defendants are overruled.
PAYSON v. DIETZ.
United States Circuit Court, District of Iowa.
PAYSON, ASSIGNEE, v. DIETZ.
The Circuit Court of the United States has jurisdiction of a common-law i r
equity action brought by an assignee in bankruptcy appointed in anot~er district
where such assignee is a citizen of another state, and the defendant is a citizen
of the state where the action is brought and the amount'4n dispute exceeds the
sum of $500.
Jurisdiction of the state and federal courts as affected by the Bankruptcy Act
considered.
THE petition alleged that the plaintiff "Joseph R. Payson,
assignee in bankruptcy of the Republic Insurance Company of
Chicago, Illinois, is a citizen of the state of Illinois, and that the
lefendant is a citizen of the state of Iowa."
The petition then proceeded to set out a case to recover of the
defendant the sum of $600, the amount of an unpaid assessment
upon stock held by him in the Republic Insurance Company.
Among other averments was one that this company, by reason of
losses in the Chicago fire, was unable to meet its debts and liabili-
ties except by an assessment upon its stockholders; that the said
company had been adjudged a bankrupt by the proper District
Court in Illinois ; and that the said court, after notice to the
stockholders, ordered the assignee to make upon them a call and
assessment for the whole amount due and unpaid upon their stock.
Defendant moved to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.
if. B. Allen, Galuzha Parsons and . if. Gatch, for the
motion.
if. Scott ifowell, Austin Adams, John . Rogers and JosepT
G. Anderson, against the motion.
DILLON, Circuit Judge.-Since the amount in dispute exceeds
five hundred dollars, and the plaintiff is a citizen of Illinois,
and the defendant'a citizen of Iowa, the jurisdiction of this court
under the 11th section of the Judiciary Act plainly exists, unless
it be taken away by the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. It is
admitted that there is no express provision depriving either this
court or the state courts of jurisdiction of actions in behalf of
assignees in bankruptcy. It is argued, however, that the jurisdic-
tion of each of these classes of courts is taken away as a neces-
sary or implied effect of the jurisdiction which is conferred by the
PAYSON v. DIETZ.
Bankrupt Act upon the District Courts of the United States as
"ourts of bankruptcy. It is claimed, and we are inclined to think
correctly, that the District Courts of the United States have juris-
diction by reason of the subject-matter of all proceedings in bank-
ruptcy, and over all actions by assignees in bankruptcy even
though such actions be not brought in the District Court
where tbe proceedings in bankruptcy are pending; and that
since Congress has thus established bankruptcy courts through-
out the United States and given them this full and plenary juris-
diction, and since the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act prescribes
that the Circuit Courts may exercise certain specific powers and
jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings and actions, the conclusion,
it is insisted, is a necessary or legitimate one, that it was the
intention of Congress that all jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases
should be exclusively in the bankruptcy courts, except so far as
the Bankrupt Act expressly confers such jurisdiction upon the
Circuit Court.
We have felt the force of the argument made to support the
exclusive jurisdiction of the District Courts in all actions relating
to the collection of the assets of the estate and in all other ac-
tions concerning the estate, except so far as a concurrent jurisdic-
tion is vested in a limited class of cases by the 2d section in the
Circuit Courts; but upon the best consideration we have been able
to give to this view, we have not been able to reach the conclusion
that it is sound.
We mention briefly some of the reasons which sustain the juris-
diction of the Circuit Courts in actions of this character.
1. This court, where the jurisdiction arising from citizenship
exists, is a court of full common-law and equity powers. In this
action the requisite citizenship does exist, and the cause of action
is not one created by the Bankrupt Act, but is essentially a com-
mon-law action to enforce a contract against the defendant. It is
true that the assignee claims title under proceedings in bankruptcy,
much like an executor under proceedings in the Probate Court, but
this does not make the action, properly viewed, a proceeding in
bankruptcy. With the consent and under the direction of the
proper bankruptcy court, there is no reason why an action like
this should not be enforced either in the state court, or in this
court, as may be deemed most expedient. Essentially it does not
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differ from actions of which both classes of courts constantly take
cognisance as part of their original and rightful jurisdiction.
2. The argument against the jurisdiction of this court derives
all its force from the supposed exclusive jurisdiction of the District
Courts, and that such jurisdiction is exclusive, both of the state
courts and of this court, except to the limited extent mentioned in
the second section of the act.
If Congress had intended by the first section of the act to make
the jurisdiction of the District Courts exclusive in the collection of
assets, and to deprive all other courts of jurisdiction over any
action by or against assignees in bankruptcy, it would have been
as easy as it would have been natural to employ language to ex-
press this purpose. But it will be observed that the word exclusive
as descriptive of the jurisdiction, is not only not used, but seems
to, have been carefully avoided.
8. That the state courts are not deprived of jurisdiction in ordi-
nary common-law and equity suits, simply because brought by the
assignee in bankruptcy, is a proposition that has the support of
many well-reasoned adjudications made both under the Bankrupt
Act of 1841 and the present act: Wood v. Jenkins, 10 Met. 583;
Stevens v. Savings Bank, 101 Mass. 109, 1869; Brown v. Hall,
7 Bush (Ky.) 69, 1869 ; Winslow v. Clark, 2 Lansing (N. Y.) 877 ;
Gilbert v. Priest, 7 Albany Law J. 119, and cases cited: Piper
v. Harmer, 5 Bank. Reg. 252; Mitchell v. Great Works, ft., 2
Story C.C. 668, per STORY, J. ; In re Central Bank, 6 Bank. Reg.
207, per BENEDICT, J. ; State v. Trustees, 5 Id. 471 ; Carr v. Gale,
8 Woodb. & Minot C. C. 64; Lucas v. Morris, 1 Paine C. C.
896; 1 Kent Com. 379, 400.
And Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, in the able judgment in which he
demonstrated the jurisdiction of the several District Courts of the
United States in all matters and cases in bankruptcy expressly ad-
mits that "S tate courts may, doubtless, exercise concurrent juris-
diction with the Circuit and District Courts in certain cases growing
aut of proceedings in-bankruptcy :" Sherman v. Bingham, 7 Bank.
Reg. 497. And if these courts may exercise a concurrent juris-
diction in any event, it would seem to be in cases where the assignee
with the consent or concurrence of the bankruptcy court resorted to
them for the ordinary purpose of collecting the assets of the estate.
Assuming the decisions in favor of the concurrent jurisdiction
of the state courts in certain classes of action by assignees in bank-
ruptcy to be correct, it would be an anomalous result and one which
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we can hardly suppose Congress intended, viz.: That the statA
courts should exercise their general concurrent jurisdiction, if the
assignee should desire to resort to them, but that this court should
not exercise its like jurisdiction.
4. The jurisdiction of this court under the Judiciary Act is plain
Repeals by implication are not favored. Jurisdiction plainly con-
ferred upon one court cannot be taken away by mere affirmative
legislation conferring like jurisdiction upon another court. Speak-
ing of this subject an eminent judge holds this language: "There
is, I think, no instance in the whole 'history of the law, where
the mere grant of jurisdiction to a particular court, without any
words of exclusion, has been held to oust any other -court of the
powers which it before possessed :" BRONSON, J., Delafield v. The
State of Illinois, 2 Hill 159.
For these reasons t;e motion is denied.
LovE, J., concurred.
Supreme Court of lNew Jersey.
THE STATE AND OTHERS V. PRITCHARD AND OTHERS.
Conviction of an infamous crime does not ipsofacto work such a forfeiture of
public office as to make the office vacant.
The right to remove a state officer for misbehavior in office does not appertain
to the executive.
Such act is judicial and belongs to the Court of Impeachments.
Certain police commissioners of Jersey City, appointed by statute, having been
convicted upon indictment of conspiracy to cheat the city and the governor hav-
ing declared their offices to be thereby vacated. and having appointed their suc-
cessors, held that such executive action was illegal and void.
CERTAIN members of the Board of Police Commissioners of Jer-
sey City having been convicted in a criminal court of a conspiracy
to defraud the city by means of their office, the governor declared
and adjudged the offices of such convicts to be vacant; and, ac-
cordingly, appointed their successors.
The commissioners being advised by their counsel1 that the
1The following is the opinion of City-Attorney LEwis, which is now
sustained by the court:-
Jersey City, N. J.. July 18th 1872.
To the Board of Police Commissioners of Jersey City :-
Gentlemen :-Pursuant to a resolution passed by your board July
13th inst., referring the opinion of the Attorney-General of the state,
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r moval was void for want of authority in the governor, continued
to occupy the office, whereupon this information in the nature of
,,1 quo warranto was sued out by the state and the governor's
appqintees.
respecting the offices of certain of the Police Commissioners, to the City
Attorney of Jersey City, and requiring his opinion in writing in refer-
ence thereto, I have considered the same, and with great deference
and respect for the eminent legal ability, learning and attainments of the
Attorney-General, permit me to say, that after a careful and laborious
examination of the books, I have been unable to find a single precedent
or authority, ancient or modern, to warrant the opinion that the convic-
tion of the Police Commissioners of Jersey City, and sentence thereon,
as the record now stands, and without any further proceedings, make
vacant their offices.
This is the position taken in the Attorney-General's opinion to the
governor, that the office of each of the Police Commissioners-MNIessrs.
Ezekiel M I. Pritchard, Thomas Edmonson, Thomas A. Gross, Frederick
A. Goetze and Isaiah Hutton-" was forfeited'and vacated by the com-
mission of a crime," which, it is said, is both "infamous and itgainst
the duty of the office." And further, the opinion holds that this "for-
feiture and continued vacancy" is duly established by the record evi-
dence (except in the case of Hutton, whose office expired by limitation,
and was filled by the joint meeting before the evidence of the forfeiture
and vacancy of his office existed).
It is noticeable that not an authority is cited by the Attorney-Gene-
ral to sustain the position taken in the opinion, that by the commission
of the crime, the office was not only forfeited but actually vacated and
continued vacant.
Assuming that such a crime as alleged has been committed, in my
opinion, neither the commission of the crime, nor conviction and sen-
tence thereon, by the Court of Oyer and Terminer, without some fur-
ther proceeding, make the offices of these commissioners vacant.
How can these offices be considered vacant while the commissioners
(except Hutton) actually hold and occupy their offices and discharge the
duties of the same? Hold, in the case of Jbhnston v. Wilson, 2 N.
Hamp. 202, that an office once filled cannot be considered vacant, until
the term expires, or until the death, resignation or removal of the per-
son appointed.
It is well stated in the opinion under consideration, that "the statute
of March 31st 1871, which appoints the commissioners, is a record of
the highest solemnity." The qualifications for office under this act,
found in section 4, are, ", that every person holding any office created by
this act, shall at the time of his election or appointment be a citizen of
the United States, and have been a resident of Jersey City for one year
at least," and these are the only qualifications required by the act, _x-
cept in case of a vacancy to be filled by the governor, "by the appoint-
ment of a suitable and discreet citizen of Jersey City."
There is no provision made in this act for their removal from office for
any cause whatever.
It is true that this conviction in question disqualifies these particular
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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
BASLrEY, C. J.-The question to be reqolved in this case is an
important one, touching as it does the authority of the chief execa
tive officer of the state, and involving, in a material particular, thL
persons convictvd, from being witnesses. and it is not because they are
C'ommissioners of Police. but because of a statute expressly excluding
them by its terms of disqualifications: Nixon's Digest, 1039, paragraph
1. Au act concerning witnesses.
It is also true that they lose the elective franchise while this cinvic-
ti,,n stands against them, and this is not because of the convictiiu inde-
pendently considered, but by virtue of an express pro'ision of the UOn-
stitution. of this state-Article 2. section: 1-which declares that no
" person convicted of a crime which now excludes him from being a
witness. unle.s pardoned or restored by law to the right of suffrage, shall
enjoy the right of an elector."
The right to vote is one of the incidents of citizenship, but to be
debarred of this right does not destroy one's citizenship.
And as voting at an election and testifying as a witness are not among
the dhties of the Police Commissioners as set forth in the charter of
Jersey City, it does not follow, as a matter of course, that being de-
barred of these particular privileges necessarily disqualifies then from
discharging, or the ability to discharge, their duties as such commis-
sioners.
While the statutes of the state make no provision for the removal
from office of a permon convicted of a crime, there is an express provi-
sion in the Constitution of the state, for the impeachment, trial and
removal from office, of the I- governor and all other civil officers, under
this state," for misdemeanor in office. This provision embraces these
commissioners, because, being appointed by joint meeting. they are espe-
cially "1 civil officers under the state," their acts subject to review, and
themselves subject to removal by the legislature.
There are rules, rights and regulations appertaining to an office by
appointment, which are not applicable to an elective office.
These commissioners being appointed (not elected) by a solemn act
of the legislature, which made no provision for their removal fir misde-
meanor in office, but under a constitution which made express provision
for such removal, it is their right to require the provisions of the Con-
stitution to be complied with before they suffer removal for misdemeanor,
and I seriously question if they can be removed before the expiration
of their term of office, in any other way than this lawfully, except by
another enactment of the legislature, by resignation or by death.
Next, let us consider what are the powers of the governor under the
statute? The charter gives him power to fill any vacancy occurring in
this Board of Police Commissioners (after the final adjournment of the
legislature), but it gives him no power to mrke a vacancy, or even to
declare that a vacancy exists. And should the governor decide that a
vacancy exists, and grant a commission to fill such supposed vacancy, it
would not be conclusive upon the rights of the incumbents : See Pei qe
v. Hlardlin, 8 B. Mon. 6 t8. But the governor has jurisdiction in the
matter to make an appointment only when there is an actual, not a sup-
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tenure of public office. Such a subject very manifestly required,
at d has received a careful and deliberate consideration on the part
of the court.
The inquiry is whether by the conviction of these criminals, or
posed vacancy. It is held to be a settled principle, that where the power
to appoint to office (as in the present case of the legislature) has been
exercised, any subsequent appointment (as is proposed for the governor)
must be void, unless the prior incumbent has been removed and the
office become vacant: Vide Thomas v. Burrus, 23 Miss. (1 Cush.) 550,
cited in 12 U. S. Digest.
But suppose it be claimed that, notwithstanding the Constitution pro-
vides the mode of removal, and no other mode is provided in the act, yet
the commissioners may be removed by the court on conviction of a crime.
Then it is submitted that the sentence and record of the court in this
case show no order of removal or judgment of ouster.
It should be observed still further, that the indictment on which con-
viction was had was against individual commissioners, and not against
their office, and the trial was not whether they should be deprived of their
office, but whether they Were guilty in manner and form as charged. So
far then as concerns their right to continue in the possession of their
offices, the proceeding on indictment can be considered only as collateral.
In Commonwealth v. Combs, 56 Penn. St. 436, it was held that where
an officer is acting under apparent authority of an act of legislature (as
these commissioners are), his title to the office cannot be assailed col-
laterally:
In Satterkee v. San Francisco, 23 Cal. 314, the court held that an officer
who has entered on the discharge of his duty, is an officer defacto, and
his eligibility cannot be inquired into in collateral proceedings.
It is considered, then, that the question of title to the office can only
be tried by a direct proceeding instituted for the purpose: 1 Pennsyl.
297; 42 Ala. 401; 25 Ark. 336; 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 549.
These commissioners being in possession of their office, and perform.
ing its duties, and claiming the right to it under color of an appointment
by the joint meeting, are officers defacto until removed by some compe-
tent authority in a direct proceeding for that purpose: See Carleton v.
People, 10 Mich. 250; 48 Maine 79.
In the case of Regina v. Baines, in Queen Anne's reign in 1706, re.
ported in 2 Lord Raymond 1265, and frequently referred to in the
books, the clerk of the peace was removed from office by the justices by
an order on complaint made, &c., for misdemeanor. But this was under
a statute providing for such removal, and on a review of these proceed-
ings upon certiorari as to the sufficiency of the complaint and order, the
court above being divided, the question went before all the judges of
England at Sergeant's Inn, where the matter being again beard in
Trinity Term, the order of removal being adjudged ill, was thereup3n
quashed by the Court of King's Bench: See also 11 Coxe 93; 1 Burrows
537, 2 Dur. & East 773.
In Bacon's Abridgment I find it laid down, that whenever an officer,
who holds an office by appointment, commits a forfeiture, he cannot
regularly be turned out, without a scire facias, or inquest of office, nor
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by the adjudication of the governor, these offic!es became vacant,
for if this was so the appointment of substitutes was admittedly
proper under the statute.
There are two points for inquiry then; first, does a public office,
by the mere fact of the malfeasance of the incumbent with respect
to it, and anterior to any judicial jndgment upon the subject, be-
come forfeited ? and second, if such forfeiture does not thus occur,
can the governor of the state adjudge the question and declare a
vacancy.
At the hearing in this court the counsel for the relators strongly
pressed the conclusion that inasmuch as a conviction of the crime
of conspiracy, by force of the act concerning witnesses, incapaci-
tates the convict fiom being a witness in a judicial proceeding, and
in consequence thereof, the Constitution prohibits such convict from
enjoying the right of suffrage, that as a necessary result, there was
a deprivation also of the prerogative to hold office. But this, I
think, is a manifest non seguitur. Because as a punishment the
law has denounced a loss of two of the rights of citizenship, it
can he be said to be completely ousted or discharged, without a writ of
discharge, for his right appearing of record the same must be defeated
by matter of as high a nature. (Various references are there given.)
It seems to be a well-settled principle also, that while an officer holds
an office defacto, his acts and doings therein will be deemed good, both
as regards the public and third parties: See 9 Mass. 231, 2 Ohio 410,
and a large number of cases in point, cited in Bacon's Abridgment.
It is proper to observe, that the Constitution not only provides for im-
peachment, but also provides that the "party convicted shall neverthe-
less be liable to indictment, trial and punishment, according to law -'
The sole purpose of the impeachment is to remove from office, and to
disqualify the party convicted. The object of the indictment, as spoken
(if in the Constitution, is punishment simply.
Still, if it be urged that the record of conviction on indictment
works a forfeiture of office, yet I cannot escape the conclusion, that to
render the office actually vacant, there must be a direct and additional
proceeding in the nature of an ouster, by inquisition of office, scb-e
facias or the like.
Conviction and sentence by the Oyer and Terminer, may possibly be
held by the Supreme Court hereafter, to be grounds for removal, but
these of themselves, it is submitted, do not vacate the office, independ-
ent of any proceedings for that purpose.
So that whether the offices of these commissioners can only be'vacated
by the legislature, or may be vacated by sufficient proceedings in a court
of competent jurisdiction, from my researches, I am constrained to hold
to the opinion that "no vacancy" exists as yet within the meaning of
the act, of the spirit of the Constitution, and that these commissioners,
who are now in possession, and discharging the duties of their office.
-re, and remain, the lawful incumbents until lawfully ramoved.
Respectfully submitted,
WM. A. LEwis, City Attorney.
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does not follow that a third right is to be withheld from the delin-
quent. IiLdeed, the reverse result is the reasonable deduction;
because it is clear on common principles that no penalty for crime
but that which is expressly prescribed can be exacted. The fact
that severely penal consequences are annexed by statute to the
commission of a breach of law, cannot warrant the aggravation by
the judicial hand, of the punishment prescribed. In this case, it
is impossible for this court to say, to these officials, that in conse-
quence of their crime, the statute declares that they cannot be
witnesses, and that the Constitution deprives them on the same
grounds of the right to vote, and that therefore the law inflicts
upon them a forfeiture of office. It may well be that the pro-
vision would be both just and expedient which should declare that
the conviction of any official delinquency should, ipso facto, work
a forfeiture of the office which had been so abused. It is possible
that the legislature, upon attention being called to the subject,
might pass an act with such an aspect; but all that the court can
say is that no such law is now in existence. The punishment of
the crime of conspiracy is definitely fixed by the Constitution and
by the statute; no addition can be made to this measure except
with the legislative sanction. The severity of the present punish-
ment may, indeed, denote that the crime is of a high grade; but
that fact leaves the question at issue to be solved, whether a con-
viction of any crime operates in the absence of any adjudication
to that effect, and without express statutory provision, so as to
forfeit an office as a legal result. I do-not think the present ap-
plication can stand on this first ground.
In the second place, the counsel of the relators in support of
their side of the case, appealed to the rules of the common law,
insisting that according to the usages of that system the king
could seize upon a public pffice on the ground that it had been for-
feited by misconduct. But I have not found that the cases with
which the court was favored, sustain the royal prerogative to so
wide an extent as is claimed in this proposition. Indeed, among
all the cases that I have examined, I find no exemplification of the
exercise of such an act of authority. On the contrary, it seems to
me quite clear that the removal of an officer, holding for a definite
term, by the sovereign, mero motu, on the plea of misbehavior,
would have been a plain usurpation. I can find, nowhere, any
trace of such a right having been claimed. And when we con-
sider that some of the offices under that government were held for
life, and others in fee, and that most of them have ever been re-
garded as property of great value, it would certainly be matter of
surprise if we found, in a system in which all valuable interests
are so jealously guarded, that franchises of such momfn: should
be liable to divestment on the arbitrary judgment of the iionarch.
If such a despotic power had existed, it would have left very
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abundant indications of its abuse during the reigns which are
memorable for little else than the oppression of the subject, ani
the rapacity of the ruler. But neither in the history of the
nation nor in the judicial decisions, do we perceive any marks of
the possession by the sovereign of such a prerogative. But to
the reverse, it will be found that, in this respect. as in all others,
:he rights of the office-holder were carefully protected, an, that
hie could not be deprived of them except by due process of law.
The method of proceeding against a delinquent official was thus:
When a question arose whether an office was forfeited, so that
the king was entitled to possession of it, an inquest of office was
instituted, which, we are told, was an inquiry made by the king's
officer, his sheriff, coroner or eseheator, virtute officii, or by writ
to them sent for that purpose, or by commissioners specially ap-
pointed. " These bequests of office," says Blackstone, 3 Com.,
ch. 17, "were devised by law as an authentic means to give the
king his right by solemn matter of record, without which he, in
general, can neither take nor part from anything. For it is a part
of the liberties of England, and greatly for the safety of the sub-
ject, that the king may not enter upon and seize any man's pos-
sess.on upon bare surmises, without the intervention of a jury."
If such inquisition resulted favorably to the pretensions of the
king. he could at once enter into the possession of the office. But
such action was far from concluding the rights of the office-holder.
He held his franchise by letters patent, and these could not be
annulled except by judicial decision. The authority just vouched
tells us that where the patentee bath done any act that amounts
to a forfeiture of the grant, the remedy to repeal the patent is by
scirefacias out of Chancery. This latter process could be brought
by the king, in order to resume the thing granted, or if the rights
:f a subject were involved, the king was bound upon petition to
allow the use of this remedy. And we have high authority for
the proposition that where a common person is obliged to bring
his action, there upon an inquisition or office found, the king is put
to his scirefacias: 9 Rep. 96.
And it is important that the nature of this proceeding by scire
facias should be noted. This process was an original writ issuing
out of Chancery, and could be made returnable into the King's
Bench. It was required to be founded on some matter of record.
In point of form the scire facias recited the patent, and set
forth the grounds of forfeiture.
On the return of the writ the defendant could appear, and if
the matter alleged was not sufficient for the repeal of the patent,
he could demur, or he could deny the facts stated, in which latter
event the issue was sent as in common cases to be tried by a jury.
Nor was the office-holder remediless in case the king, upon office
found, went into possession of the franchise, and refrained from
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issuing a scire Jacias to repeal the patent. "In order to avoid
the possession of the Crown acquired by the finding of such office,"
the language is again that of Sir William Blackstone, "the
subject may not only have his petition of right, which discloses
new facts not found by the office, and his monstrans de droit, which
relies on the facts as found; but also he may (for the most part)
traverse or deny the matter of fact itself, and put it in a course
of trial by the common-law process of a court of chancery, yet
still, in some special cases, he hath no remedy left but a mere pe-
tition of right. These traverses as well as the monstrans de droit,
were greatly enlarged and regulated, for the benefit of the sub-
ject, by the statute before mentioned and others."
That, by force of the English law, the king could not take into
his hands on his own judgment an office on the ground in question,
is abundantly shown in all the line of adjudications relating to the
subject. There is a long array of such cases, systematically ar-
ranged by Lord COKE, in Sir George Reynel's Case, 9 Rep. 95.
Nor does the case of Sir John Savage which was much pressed
upon the argument by the counsel of the relators, gainsay the
principle above enunciated. For this decision 2 Dyer 151 was
referred to, but this account is too meagre to be perspicuous, and
the point and grounds of judgment can be made intelligible only
by a reference to the narration in Keilway 194. This report is in
Norman French, and any gentleman who has (perhaps) improved
a part of his leisure in acquiring an insight into that unclassic
jargon, will find that the subject of inquiry was this: The tle-
fendant was sheriff of Worcester, and an information was exhibited
in the King's Bench showing his title, and reciting that the Com-
missioners of Oyer and Terminer had found that he held such
office by letters patent in fee; that certain persons charged with
felony had been committed to his custody whom he had "wilfully
and feloniously" suffered to escape. The information then stated
that for this cause the king had taken possession of the office.
After these averments then followed a statement that upon these
facts a seirefacias had been awarded, setting forth these matters,
and directing the defendant to appear and show cause wherefore
"our letters patent aforesaid, &c., should not be annulled, revoked
and cancelled." To this information the defendant appeared and
pleaded, and two of the questions mooted and decided were whether
the Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer could hold an inquest
of office, and whether the finding of two indictments for miscon-
duct in office was equivalent to finding a forfeiture, and the court
held in the affirmative on both points. Lord CoKE, in Sir George
Be ynel's Case, just cited, refers to this decision as establishing the
rule that "two matters of record shall amount to an office." This
authority, therefore, which seems to be somewhat anomalous, falls
short of giving support to the proposition that an indictment and
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conviction would have justified the seizure of an office on the part
of the English sovereign. " An information, or an indictment fbr
an offence which is a cause of forfeiture, and a conviction on it,"
is given by Baron Co. xsS, as the foundation for a .'cire facias to
repeal letters patent; but no authority has been adduced, nor, as
is believed, can be found to the effect that such proceedings will
in themselves justify the resumption of the official franchise, with-
out suit, by the monarch.
The result to which therefore I am led is, that even on the
assumption that the modes of proceeding with respect to forfeited
offices are identical in this state with those which were established
in use under the English government, nevertheless the defendants
in this case, under the circumstances stated in the pleadings, could
not lawfully be put aside from their official positions on the ground
which thus far has been the subject of discussion. It has appeared
that an indictment and conviction are not equivalent to an inquest
of office, and that consequently the king, in such a condition of
things, could not have entered and ousted the office-holder from
the possession. If this is so, it concededly must follow that such
power does not reside in the executive of this state.
But my consideration of the questions involved in this inquiry
has also entirely satisfied me that there is not the least propriety
in the assumption that the authority of our executive over public
officers is at all comparable with that of the English king. And I
have stated the common-law mode of proceeding with regard
to official misbehavior, not. because I think such mode applicable
to our political system, but for the purpose to some extent at least
of showing its discordance with such system. The very ground-
work of the common-law practice is wanting with us. At common
law the theory was, that the king was the head and fountain of all
office. An office was considered a royal franchise in the hands of
a subject. In legal contemplation the incumbent held directly
from and under the Crown, one of the implied conditions of such
holding being that the duties of the office should be properly dis-
charged. It was hence the natural product of this theory that if
such condition was broken, he who had granted could retake the
gift into possession. It stood upon the footing of other species of
property growing out of conditional grants. Out of jealousy of the
royal power, the free genius of the common law declared a dis-
ab-lity in the king to enter upon the office without a finding of
this condition having been broken by an inquest of office. But
still the principle was recognised, although put under a check,
that the power of appointment involved, as an apt incident or con-
venient supplement, the right to supervise and remove. In addi-
tion to this, the king had originally sat as the supreme judge in
the aula regia, and hypothetically at least continued to be the
chief administrator of the laws and dispenser of justice. It con-
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sistently resulted that a ruler, clothed with such powers as these,
should, subject to the limitations already defined, be also invested
with the superintendency over public offices. Every officer was the
deputy of the sovereign; the condition of the tenure was good
behavior, and on the breach of such condition the king, as the
general patron of official franchise, and the representative of the
public interests, was empowered, in the mode prescribed by the
law, to have a forfeiture of the office declared.
But none of these royal prerogatives, which so appropriately
embrace an absolute control over all public offices, are to be found
among the powers which go to make up the authority of the execu-
tive of this state. Neither theoretically nor in practice is the
executive the fountain of office. Nor are public offices franchises
of the executive, nor does he distribute them among his deputies.
According to the polity of this Commonwealth, all public office
proceeds, in theory and fact, from the people. With respect to
some of the more important offices the governor cannot fill them
by appointment; his function is that of nomination, and with
respect to others of them, he has no concern; they are under legis-
tive control solely. In the present instance the incumbents who
are sought to be removed were appointed by a special act of legis-
lation-they hold their positions from the people. How, then, can
it be said that they are accountable to the governor with regard
to their official conduct? By the statute in question the executiv6
is not given any supervision over these officials. All the authority
that it confers upon him is to fill the office in case of a vacancy.
It imparts to him no faculty to declare judicially that such vacancy
has occurred; and if such faculty exists, it must be as an inherent
constituent of the executive office. I have not been able to per-
ceive any intimation, not even the least, either in the Consitution
of this state, its system of laws or legal observances, that the right
of superintendency over, or power of removal from public offices,
except in instances of statutory specification, has been delegated to
the executive head of the government. That such authority has
not been expressly conferred is unquestionable; and if such is to
be conceded, it must be from the analogy which the executive
office bears to the English monarch. I have stated the reasons for
my conviction that such similitude is absent. If such analogy
existed, the authority to remove would have to be exercised ac-
cording to the English mode, and it has already been shown that
such mode in the present case has not been pursued. No inquest
of office has been held, and without such procedure no English
sovereign could have removed an offending incumbent. But sup-
pose the proceedings in the present instance had been squared to
this common-law pattern. In such event a county sheriff, virtute
6fflcii, or commissioners under a special authority from the gov-
ernor, would have convened a jury to make inquisition. Before
ruch jury the party charged with malfeasance could not have been
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!card; and upon the ex parte finding of such tribunal, the g-overnoj
;ould, as it is claimed, have been empowered to oust the incumn-
')ent and seize the office, and the sole remedy by such evicted
ncumbent would have been by petition to the executive. It does
not seem to me that any one will deny that such a procedure woul
be in strange antagonism with all the other parts of our frame of
laws. Its existence could not be palliated by any of those theo-
retical reasons which apply to the possession of the power by the
English monarch. Unlike the precedent of the common law, the
executive would proceed to remove an office-holder whose t('nure,
like his own, was derived from the will of the people. Such a
course is inconsistent with the fundamental idea upon which is
founded the whole structure of our political institutions, which is
that the power of each organ of the government is definite, and
that the residuum of power remains in the hands of the mass of
the community. Such a theory entirely repels the doctrine that
the chief executive has any power to remove a subordinate, whose
title stands on the same level as his own, unless such power of
removal is expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred by
the law of our political system. It is believed that these inquisi-
tions to inquire as to forfeitures are utterly unknown to the laws
and usages of this country. Such a power has never certainly
been heard of in this state, nor has any precedent for the use of
such remedy been traced in the legal forms of any state in this
Union. Such procedure has never been sustained by any Ameri-
can court, and the subject does not appear to have been ever dis-
cussed in any of our own courts, from the reason that until the
present occasion the attempt to evict from office by a supposed
analogy to this mode of proceeding has never been made. The use
of such a procedure is condemned gravissino judicio taciturnitatis.
But again, the function to declare an office forfeited from
malfeasance is obviously judicial in its character, and this leads to
the second inquiry whether such a function belongs to the governor
of this state.
It has already appeared that the authority to adjudge as to the
forfeiture of office did not belong to the British crown. The king
could not seize the office without inquest or office found in his
favor, and could not recall his letters patent except upon a judg-
ment to that effect by one of the regular courts.
The question, therefore, is, whether the prerogative of the
governor of this state, in this respect, overtops that of the British
sovereign ? If it has this reach, of course the power must be
derived from the Constitution of the state.
But the framework of the government of this state has been too
carefully constructed to leave so important a matter as this in any
doubt or subject to any uncertainty. Its different departments
have been nicely adjusted, and the boundaries of their action have
been accurately and plainly set and established. And in no part
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-if the instrument is the line of division between the respective
branches more clearly marked than between the powers of the
executive and those of the judiciary.
By article III. the Constitution declares "The powers of the
government shall be divided into three distinct departments : the
legislative, executive and judicial ; and no person or persons belong
tag to, or constituting one of these departments, shall exercise any
of the powers properly belonging to either of the other, except as
herein expressly provided."
The fifth article appertains specially to the executive office. Its
prnvisions are perfectly clear and explicit. It declares that th
executive power shall be vested in the governor; that he shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, and grant, under the
great seal of the state, commissions to all such officers as shall
require to be commissioned; that he shall be a member of the
court of pardons, and may remit fines and forfeitures, and that
"when a vacancy happens during the recess of the legislature, in
any office which is to be filled by the governor and senate, or by
the legislature in joint meeting, the governor shall fill such
vacancy, &c."
These are all the powers having the least bearing on the subject
under consideration, attached by the original law to the office of
the executive.
By article VI. the whole judicial power is placed in the courts.
It is obvious, therefore, that the governor of this state is not
possessed of a particle of judicial capacity. I cannot see that a
single one of the powers conferred upon this high office, even
borders upon such authority. It is true that he is empowered to
fill certain vacancies, and in doing such acts he must decide whe-
ther or not such vacancies exist. But such decision is in no sense
a judicial act. It is a mere assumption of the existence of a cer-
tain state of facts on which to base executive action. Such assump-
tions or determinations by a chief executive, when they relate to
or affect private interests, have no binding force. If the executive
should fill an office on the conviction that the incumbent was dead,
it is presumed, that in the mind of lawyers there would prevail no
doubt, that if the fact of death had not occurred, the executive
action would be void. An estoppel on private right by executive
decision, is not likely to be pleaded by any well-skilled counsel.
I think there is no reasonable ground on which to base a claim for
the existence of any right of judicature in the governor of the
state.
And there can be as little doubt that the act of declaring that
the offices involved in this case had been forfeited, w,s a judichJ
decision. It had all the essential elements of such an adjudication.
It was a determination of the fact as well as the law, and comprised
at once the functions of the jury and the judge, and it related to a
r;.bt 4t nroperty. The questions to be settled were, whether the
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officer had misbehaved, and that was an issue of fact; and whether
such misbehavior amounted to a forfeiture of office; and that was
an issue of law. The point of fact required the introduction of
evidence, and for this purpose, the governor had before him the
record of the conviction of these defendants in a criminal court.
Whether such record would be competent for the purpose fir which
it was used, is open as a question of pure law, to considerable
uncertainty, the usual and inveterate rule being that a crnniinal
record is not admissible in any suit or proceeding relating to pro-
perty or the civil rights of persons. But it is enough to denote
that here was presented a rule of evidence to be passed upon. In
all its parts the proceeding was one of ordinary judicature. And
then, too, after the ascertainment of the fact it became necessary
to apply the rule of law. The result was an announcement that
the forfeiture had been incurred, and this clearly was an act of
judicial discretion. Than the judgment of the judge there is no
other legal test of the effect a certain act of misconduct has upon
the right to office. What malfeasances will work a forfeiture is no
part of the lex scrl]pta. There is no statute upon the subject. It
is obvious that it may well be that some convictions in a criminal
court may not produce such a result. The point is not met by the
suggestion that in this case the crime committed was one malum
in se, and made highly penal, because if the jurisdiction is vested
in the executive on this occasion, it belongs to him in all cases of
official misdemeanor. It is not too much to say that of all the
cases where there is room for the use of a graduated standard for
judicial judgment, the class of cases which comprises the one now
considered is the most prominent. What jurist or. judge has ever
attempted to define that category of offences which in law are
operative to deprive the wrongdoer of a public office ? And yet,
such was the question upon which the executive was called upon
to pronounce. These acts were judicial in the most rigorous sense
of the term.
And there are other noticeable features of the affair. A matter
of fact was to be investigated and settled, and yet the testimony
of witnesses could not have been compelled, and oaths could not
have been administered. The defendants, whose rights were in-
volved, were not summoned, had no hearing, and were condemned
in their absence. Citizens were deprived of valuable civil rights
which they had not the least opportunity to vindicate, and when
the decree of deprivation had been pronounced they had not even
the right to appeal. The arbitrary character of such a jurisdic-
tion would of itself be sufficient to demonstrate that it does not
exist by force of the Constitution of this state. The power of ad-
judging the question of the forfeiture of office is the capacity of
a judge, and does not, in any degree, appertain to the executive
authority.
It cannot fail to have been perceived that the question discussed
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elates merely to the matter of jurisdiction. That an officer wh
as made use of the opportunity which his position afforded, tc
,erpetrate a fraud upon the public, should be summarily cashiered.
i a proposition entitled to universal assent. But the result to
-hich I have arrived is, that the finding of the fact of misconduct,
Lnd the graduation of punishment, are judicial, and not by virtue
)f our system of laws executive functions. And I think, upon reflec-
ion, there will be few minds that will deny the propriety of the
astablishment of this power in a judicial depositary. Its effect is
co put the rights of the citizen under the safeguard of the ordinary
tribunals, and to surround them with the protection of those modes
of proceeding, trial and supervision which are the best, and per-
haps, only guarantees against error and injustice. To have left
such cognisance to the executive branch of the government, would
have been to make these valuable interests to be dependent on the
conclusions of a single mind, unassisted by the usual methods, for the
elucidation of truth, the responsibility of decision being unrelieved
by the consciousness that, if the conclusion should be incorrect,
the error could be corrected by some supervisory tribunal. Every
proceeding to remove an officer for official misconduct or neglect
is essentially and thoroughly a judicial proceeding, and has con-
sequently, and with the utmost propriety, been confided to that
branch of the state government. Nor in the frame of the state
Constitution is there wanting an organ appropriate to the exercise
of this jurisdiction. I think the authority in question is vested in
the court for the trial of impeachments. By section 17 of article
6, which affects a distribution of the judicial power, a portion of
it is vested in this tribunal. Its constitution is defined by section
3d, the right to impeach being given to the Assembly, and that
of trial to the Senate.
The jurisdiction of this important court is not, in express terms,
defined. But I think it clear that its cognisance is confined to
the misconduct of state officials. In England, as is well known,
the jurisdiction of Parliament in this respect is much more ex-
tensive. It is said that in that kingdom all the king's subjects
are impeachable in Parliament. In practice, however, this kind
of prosecution has usually been confined to that class of misdeeds
which are particularly injurious by the abuse of important office,4
of public trust. But such an extent of jurisdiction in this court
would be incompatible with the most cherished notions usually
prevalent in this country with respect to the safeguards necessary
to the protection of persons and property. And that the scope
of the jurisdiction of the court of impeachments in this state is
much more limited than this, and is restricted to persons holding
office under the state, is convincingly manifest from that pro-
vision of the Constitution which declares that the judgment in such
eases "shall not extend further than a removal from office, and
to a disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, profit
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or trust under this state." Thus, by imperative implication, the
limit of jurisdiction is restricted to the otnces of this particular
class of persons. The only remaining question is whether the
office-holders now involved in this controversy belong in the con-
stitutional sense to this class of state officers of whose mi.-deeds
this court of impeachment takes coguisance. The pertinent pro-
vision of the Constitution is in these words, viz. : The governor
and all other civil officers under this state shall be liable to im-
peachmnent for misdemeanor in office, during their continuance in
office, and for two years thereafter." The present oflficials are
state officers, and I have failed to see how they are to be excluded
from the general description of the subjects of impeachment just
quoted. The generality of the language, so as to comprise the
whole class of state officers, appears to have been designed. In
other parts where the intention was to restrict the effect of a clause
to constitutional officers, the language employed is aptly limited.
If this comprehensive designation of the objects of cognisance of
this court is not to be fully effectuated, but is to be confined to
certain classes of officers, where are the limits to be set ? If it
does not take in all state officers, which are to be embraced and
which excluded? The whole matter would be quite arbitrary. If
the executive can try and pronounce upon the delinquency of the
present officials, the extent of his power would seem entirely in-
definite and precarious, and no reason is perceived why it would
not cover the whole field of misbehavior by these public agents.
By force of such a construction of the authority of the governor,
the functions of the court of impeachments would be substantially
superseded.
From these considerations, I have come to the conclusion that
these defendants were impeachable for their alleged misdeeds, and
that it would have been competent for the court of impeachments
to remove them friom their posts. A vacancy in these offices would
have thus been created, and, in my estimation, this cannot be
effected by any other power in the state.
The only adjudication which has come under my notice, which
has much relevancy to the subject under discussion, is that of the
Court of Appeals in Kentucky, in the case of Page v. Hardin,
reported in 8 B. Monroe 648. The controversy related to the
office of secretary of state. It appeared that the governor had
adjudged that the secretary, "by his failure, wilful neglect and
refusal to reside at the seat of government, and perform the duties
of secretary," had abandoned his office, and that the same had
become vacant, and thereupon had appointed a successor. The
decision of the court was that these proceedings were unwarranted,
that the secretary was not removable either at the pleasure of the
governor, or on his judgment, for a misbehavior in office, and that
in such cases the jurisdiction resided in the court of imnpeachiments.
The opinion read in the case exhibits much thought, as well as
